Related papers: Money as Minimal Complexity
Fairness-aware classification requires balancing performance and fairness, often intensified by intersectional biases. Conflicting fairness definitions further complicate the task, making it difficult to identify universally fair solutions.…
We continue the study of the performance for fixed-price mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem, and improve approximation ratios of welfare-optimal mechanisms in several settings. Specifically, in the case where only the buyer…
In a money exchange process involving a seller and a buyer, we develop a straightforward model encompassing conservative, non-conservative, and systems with or without debt. Our model integrates the Fermi function to capture the behavior of…
In this paper we consider the problem of characterizing the minimum energy configurations of a finite system of particles interacting between them due to attracting or repulsive forces given by a certain inter molecular potential. We limit…
We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure $\mu$ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain…
Consider a graph with n nodes and m edges, independent edge weights and lengths, and arbitrary distance demands for node pairs. The spanner problem asks for a minimum-weight subgraph that satisfies these demands via sufficiently short paths…
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference list of neighbors for every vertex. A swap in $I$ is the exchange of two consecutive vertices in a preference list. A swap can be viewed as…
Massively-parallel graph algorithms have received extensive attention over the past decade, with research focusing on three memory regimes: the superlinear regime, the near-linear regime, and the sublinear regime. The sublinear regime is…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
Market Microstructure is the investigation of the process and protocols that govern the exchange of assets with the objective of reducing frictions that can impede the transfer. In financial markets, where there is an abundance of recorded…
We consider an extension of the {\em popular matching} problem in this paper. The input to the popular matching problem is a bipartite graph G = (A U B,E), where A is a set of people, B is a set of items, and each person a belonging to A…
Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…
In this paper, we study the Maximum Vertex-weighted $b$-Matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs in a new game-theoretical environment. In contrast to other game-theoretical settings, we consider the case in which the value of the tasks…
We study fair mechanisms for the (asymmetric) one-sided allocation problem with m items and n multi-unit demand agents with additive, unit-sum valuations. The symmetric case (m=n), the one-sided matching problem, has been studied…
In a classical scheduling problem, we are given a set of $n$ jobs of unit length along with precedence constraints, and the goal is to find a schedule of these jobs on $m$ identical machines that minimizes the makespan. Using the standard…
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…
Recently, in order to explore the mechanism behind wealth or income distribution, several models have been proposed by applying principles of statistical mechanics. These models share some characteristics, such as consisting of a group of…
We study the problem of exchange when 1) agents are endowed with heterogeneous indivisible objects, and 2) there is no money. In general, no rule satisfies the three central properties Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and…
Multi-item revenue-optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often offering buyers randomized lotteries of goods. In the standard buy-one model, it is known that optimal mechanisms can yield revenue infinitely higher than that…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…