Related papers: Money as Minimal Complexity
We consider multi-item exchange markets in which agents want to receive one of their target bundles of resources. The model encompasses well-studied markets for kidney exchange, lung exchange, and multi-organ exchange. We identify a general…
A combinatorial trade is a pair of sets of blocks of elements that can be exchanged while preserving relevant subset intersection constraints. The class of balanced and swap-robust minimal trades was proposed in [1] for exchanging blocks of…
We consider truthful combinatorial auctions with items $M = [m]$ for sale to $n$ bidders, where each bidder $i$ has a private monotone valuation $v_i : 2^M \to R_+$. Among truthful mechanisms, maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanisms achieve the…
We design simple mechanisms to approximate the Gains from Trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that even…
This work addresses fair allocation of indivisible items in settings wherein it is feasible to create copies of resources or dispose of tasks. We establish that exact maximin share (MMS) fairness can be achieved via limited duplication of…
We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessarily identical) distributions. There are four widely-used and…
We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a…
We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors of $2$ and $\min\{m-k+1,…
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…
This paper studies four trading algorithms of a professional trader at a multilateral trading facility, observing a realistic two-sided limit order book whose dynamics are driven by the order book events. The identity of the trader can be…
The sequential allocation protocol is a simple and popular mechanism to allocate indivisible goods, in which the agents take turns to pick the items according to a predefined sequence. While this protocol is not strategy-proof, it has been…
The Massively Parallel Computation (MPC) model serves as a common abstraction of many modern large-scale data processing frameworks, and has been receiving increasingly more attention over the past few years, especially in the context of…
In this paper we study a variant of the branched transportation problem, that we call multi-material transport problem. This is a transportation problem, where distinct commodities are transported simultaneously along a network. The cost of…
In this work we introduce a new and richer class of finite order Markov chain models and address the following model selection problem: find the Markov model with the minimal set of parameters (minimal Markov model) which is necessary to…
This paper is concerned with general spatially explicit versions of three stochastic models for the dynamics of money that have been introduced and studied numerically by statistical physicists: the uniform reshuffling model, the immediate…
A simple-triangle graph is the intersection graph of triangles that are defined by a point on a horizontal line and an interval on another horizontal line. The time complexity of the recognition problem for simple-triangle graphs was a…
We consider the communication complexity of finding an approximate maximum matching in a graph in a multi-party message-passing communication model. The maximum matching problem is one of the most fundamental graph combinatorial problems,…
We study the problem of designing mechanisms for trading networks that satisfy four desired properties: dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, efficiency, weak budget balance (WBB), and individual rationality (IR). Although there exist…
We study the menu complexity of optimal and approximately-optimal auctions in the context of the "FedEx" problem, a so-called "one-and-a-half-dimensional" setting where a single bidder has both a value and a deadline for receiving an…
We represent an exchange economy in terms of statistical ensembles for complex networks by introducing the concept of market configuration. This is defined as a sequence of nonnegative discrete random variables $\{w_{ij}\}$ describing the…