Related papers: Money as Minimal Complexity
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting,…
If $M$ is an $m \times m$ matrix over $\{ 0, 1, \ast \}$, an $M$-partition of a graph $G$ is a partition $(V_1, \dots V_m)$ such that $V_i$ is completely adjacent (non-adjacent) to $V_j$ if $M_{ij} = 1$ ($M_{ij} = 0$), and there are no…
We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…
In this paper we study general transportation problems in $\mathbb{R}^n$, in which $m$ different goods are moved simultaneously. The initial and final positions of the goods are prescribed by measures $\mu^-$, $\mu^+$ on $\mathbb{R}^n$ with…
This paper considers the ideal gas-like model of trading markets, where each individual is identified as a gas molecule that interacts with others trading in elastic or money-conservative collisions. Traditionally this model introduces…
We study a simple exchange model in which price is fixed and the amount of a good transferred between actors depends only on the actors' respective budgets and the existence of a link between transacting actors. The model induces a…
The network pricing problem (NPP) is a bilevel problem, where the leader optimizes its revenue by deciding on the prices of certain arcs in a graph, while expecting the followers (also known as the commodities) to choose a shortest path…
A prevalent market structure in the Internet economy consists of buyers and sellers connected by a platform (such as Amazon or eBay) that acts as an intermediary and keeps a share of the revenue of each transaction. While the optimal…
A bipartite graph $G(U,V;E)$ that admits a perfect matching is given. One player imposes a permutation $\pi$ over $V$, the other player imposes a permutation $\sigma$ over $U$. In the greedy matching algorithm, vertices of $U$ arrive in…
A large set of daily FOREX time series is analyzed. The corresponding correlation matrices (CM) are constructed for USD, EUR and PLZ used as the base currencies. The triangle rule is interpreted as constraints reducing the number of…
We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…
We consider a multiproduct monopoly pricing model. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented via upgrade pricing -- a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach…
We examine information structure design, also called "persuasion" or "signaling", in the presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a…
We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer's valuations towards the two items are independent and additive. In this setting, optimal mechanism is unknown for general valuation distributions. We…
This paper presents a simple method for a posteriori (historical) multi-variate multi-stage optimal trading under transaction costs and a diversification constraint. Starting from a given amount of money in some currency, we analyze the…
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK…
The unit value of a commodity that Michio Morishima's method and its variations enable to determine correctly, is the sum of the value of the commodities it contains (inputs) and the quantity of labor required for its production. However,…
Real-world pricing mechanisms are typically optimized using training data, a setting corresponding to the \textit{pricing query complexity} problem in Mechanism Design. The previous work [LSTW23] studies the \textit{single-distribution}…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…
We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject to a matroid constraint. We show that all such mechanisms obtain a constant fraction of the optimal welfare at any equilibrium of…