Related papers: Evolutionary Games on the Torus with Weak Selectio…
We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of two strategies, A…
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a…
In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Decartes' rule of signs, we provide a formula…
Involution, a phenomenon of excessive competition with diminishing returns, has become a pressing socio-economic concern in contemporary China, prompting both academic inquiry and policy interventions. This paper proposes an evolutionary…
Our paper gives bounds for the rate of convergence for a class of random walks on the d-dimensional torus generated by a set of n vectors in R^d/Z^d. We give bounds on the discrepancy distance from Haar measure; our lower bound holds for…
We study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in a population of finite size. Individuals in the population are divided into two dynamically evolving groups. The structure of the population is formally described by a Wright-Fisher type…
We consider payoff-based learning of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in multi-agent systems. Our focus is on games with jointly convex constraints of a linear structure and strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. We present a convergent…
We give tolerant testers with sublinear query complexity in the adjacency-list model for Unique Games. Prior tolerant testers required structural assumptions such as expansion or clusterability. For Unique Games, the tester distinguishes…
Toral (2002) considered an ensemble of N\geq2 players. In game B a player is randomly selected to play Parrondo's original capital-dependent game. In game A' two players are randomly selected without replacement, and the first transfers one…
Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical methods that exhibit last-iterate convergence for the…
In this paper, I model and study the process of natural selection between all possible mixed strategies in classical two-player two-strategy games. I derive and solve an equation that is a natural generalization of the Taylor-Jonker…
There is an abundance of empirical evidence in the numerical relativity literature that the form in which the Einstein evolution equations are written plays a significant role in the lifetime of numerical simulations. This paper attempts to…
We consider the behaviour of minimax recursions defined on random trees. Such recursions give the value of a general class of two-player combinatorial games. We examine in particular the case where the tree is given by a Galton-Watson…
We consider a meanfield system of interacting Fisher-Wright diffusions with selection and rare mutation on the geographic space $\{1,2,...,N\}$. The type 1 has fitness 0, type 2 has fitness 1 and (rare) mutation occurs from type 1 to 2 at…
Consider a rooted Galton-Watson tree $T$, to each of whose edges we assign, independently, a weight that equals $+1$ with probability $p_{1}$, $0$ with probability $p_{0}$ and $-1$ with probability $p_{-1}=1-p_{1}-p_{0}$. We play a game on…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
We study a model of a spatial evolutionary game, based on the Prisoner's dilemma for two regular arrangements of players, on a square lattice and on a triangular lattice. We analyze steady state distributions of players which evolve from…
Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games. But often, the interaction between several…
Recent successes of game-theoretic formulations in ML have caused a resurgence of research interest in differentiable games. Overwhelmingly, that research focuses on methods and upper bounds on their speed of convergence. In this work, we…
Theory of quantum games is a new area of investigation that has gone through rapid development during the last few years. Initial motivation for playing games, in the quantum world, comes from the possibility of re-formulating quantum…