Related papers: Interdependent Security Games on Networks under Be…
We study the weighted Myerson value for Network games extending a similar concept for communication situations. Network games, unlike communication situations, treat direct and indirect links among players differently and distinguish their…
We study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities…
We train two neural networks adversarially to play static games. At each iteration, a row and column network observe a new random bimatrix game and output individual mixed strategies. The parameters of each network are independently updated…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…
In recent work by Bramoull\'{e} and Kranton, a model for the provision of public goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game and properties of the network were established. This model was further…
We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a social network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a…
The amount of personal information contributed by individuals to digital repositories such as social network sites has grown substantially. The existence of this data offers unprecedented opportunities for data analytics research in various…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions…
In this work, we consider dynamic influence maximization games over social networks with multiple players (influencers). The goal of each influencer is to maximize their own reward subject to their limited total budget rate constraints.…
We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude…
Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems…
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be…
This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…
In the classical Binary Networked Public Goods (BNPG) game, a player can either invest in a public project or decide not to invest. Based on the decisions of all the players, each player receives a reward as per his/her utility function.…
To what extent does the structure of the players' strategy space influence the efficiency of decentralized solutions in congestion games? In this work, we investigate whether better performance are possible when restricting to load…
We introduce a game where players selfishly choose a resource and endure a cost depending on the number of players choosing nearby resources. We model the influences among resources by a weighted graph, directed or not. These games are…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…
Inspired by real world examples, e.g. the Internet, researchers have introduced an abundance of strategic games to study natural phenomena in networks. Unfortunately, almost all of these games have the conceptual drawback of being…