Related papers: Interdependent Security Games on Networks under Be…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
We here study the Battle of the Sexes game, a textbook case of asymmetric games, on small networks. Due to the conflicting preferences of the players, analytical approaches are scarce and most often update strategies are employed in…
We study public goods games played on networks with possibly non-reciprocal relationships between players. Examples for this type of interactions include one-sided relationships, mutual but unequal relationships, and parasitism. It is well…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
Motivated by applications in social networks, peer-to-peer and overlay networks, we define and study the Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game - we have a collection of n players or nodes each of whom has a budget for purchasing links; each…
We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…
Firms in inter-organizational networks such as supply chains or strategic alliances are exposed to interdependent risks. These are risks that are transferable across partner firms. They can be decomposed into intrinsic risks a firm faces…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
We introduce a novel framework for computing optimal randomized security policies in networked domains which extends previous approaches in several ways. First, we extend previous linear programming techniques for Stackelberg security games…
Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…
The reliability and security of a user in an interconnected system depends on all users' collective effort in security. Consequently, investments in security technologies by strategic users is typically modeled as a public good problem,…
Purely affective interaction allows the welfare of an individual to depend on her own actions and on the profile of welfare levels of others. Under an assumption on the structure of mutual affection that we interpret as "non-explosive…
The standard risk minimization paradigm of machine learning is brittle when operating in environments whose test distributions are different from the training distribution due to spurious correlations. Training on data from many…
We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…
We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…
We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, wherein two camps aim to drive the average opinion of the population in their own favor. Using a well-established model of opinion dynamics,…
In this paper, we study the problem of the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of N-player games over jointly strongly connected switching networks. The action of each player is governed by a class of uncertain nonlinear systems. Our…
In cybersecurity, attackers range from brash, unsophisticated script kiddies and cybercriminals to stealthy, patient advanced persistent threats. When modeling these attackers, we can observe that they demonstrate different risk-seeking and…