Related papers: Strategic Bidding in an Accumulating Priority Queu…
We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…
This paper investigates a partially observable queueing system with $N$ nodes in which each node has a dedicated arrival stream. There is an extra arrival stream to balance the load of the system by routing its customers to the shortest…
We consider an M/M/1 queueing model where customers can strategically decide to enter or leave the queue. We characterize the class of queueing regimes such that, for any parameters of the model, the socially efficient behavior is an…
This paper studies the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games with coupling constraints, where each player optimizes its strategy depending on its local cost function and the estimated strategy…
We consider the problem of customer equilibrium strategies in an M/M/1 queue under dynamic service control. The service rate switches between a low and a high value depending on system congestion. Arriving customers do not observe the…
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in…
Consider an unobservable $M|G|1$ queue with preemptive-resume scheduling and two priority classes. Customers are strategic and may join the premium class for a fee. We analyze the resulting equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium stability, and…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
This paper investigates the game theory of resource-allocation situations where the "first come, first serve" heuristic creates inequitable, asymmetric benefits to the players. Specifically, this problem is formulated as a Generalized Nash…
We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…
This paper presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to represent strategic bidding behavior in freight transport markets. Using this algorithm, we investigate whether feasible market equilibriums arise without any central…
In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market setup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receiving submitted bid vectors from the buyers,…
This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…
Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…
We formulate and solve a multi-player stochastic differential game between financial agents who seek to cost-efficiently liquidate their position in a risky asset in the presence of jointly aggregated transient price impact, along with…
We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter for a random fee in order to become premium customers. This scheme incentivizes all customers to purchase…
We consider the problem of customer equilibrium behavior of a single server Markovian queue with dynamic control of the service rate. Customers arrive according a Poisson procedure and the system administrator makes a service rate choice…
In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem,…
Several works have recently suggested to model the problem of coordinating the charging needs of a fleet of electric vehicles as a game, and have proposed distributed algorithms to coordinate the vehicles towards a Nash equilibrium of such…