Related papers: The Territorial Raider Game and Graph Derangements
This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or…
A mobile agent, starting from a node $s$ of a simple undirected connected graph $G=(V,E)$, has to explore all nodes and edges of $G$ using the minimum number of edge traversals. To do so, the agent uses a deterministic algorithm that allows…
Consider an undirected graph modeling a social network, where the vertices represent users, and the edges do connections among them. In the competitive diffusion game, each of a number of players chooses a vertex as a seed to propagate…
Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed toward a pure Nash equilibrium via a local search method. The quality of the equilibrium reached may depend heavily on the order by which players are chosen to perform…
Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…
This paper aims to accommodate games in which the players' dynamics are subject to un-modeled and disturbance terms. The un-modeled and disturbance terms are regarded as extended states for which observers are designed to estimate them.…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
To address the dynamic nature of real-world networks, we generalize competitive diffusion games and Voronoi games from static to temporal graphs, where edges may appear or disappear over time. This establishes a new direction of studies in…
In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing…
In this paper, the problem of finding a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of a networked game is studied. Players are only able to choose their decisions from a feasible action set. The feasible set is considered to be a private linear…
An injective coloring of a given graph G = (V, E) is a vertex coloring of G such that any two vertices with common neighbor receive distinct colors. An e-injective coloring of a graph G is a vertex coloring of G such that any two vertices…
Security games model strategic interactions in adversarial real-world applications. Such applications often involve extremely large but highly structured strategy sets (e.g., selecting a distribution over all patrol routes in a given…
The functionality of a graph $G$ is the minimum number $k$ such that in every induced subgraph of $G$ there exists a vertex whose neighbourhood is uniquely determined by the neighborhoods of at most $k$ other vertices in the subgraph. The…
In this paper we develop a novel approach to the convergence of Best-Response Dynamics for the family of interference games. Interference games represent the fundamental resource allocation conflict between users of the radio spectrum. In…
We study generalized games with full row rank equality constraints and we provide a strikingly simple proof of strong monotonicity of the associated KKT operator. This allows us to show linear convergence to a variational equilibrium of the…
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) learn an implicit generative model from data samples through a two-player game. In this paper, we study the existence of Nash equilibrium of the game which is consistent as the number of data samples…
Individuals, or organizations, cooperate with or compete against one another in a wide range of practical situations. Such strategic interactions are often modeled as games played on networks, where an individual's payoff depends not only…
We introduce a graph decomposition which exists for all simple, connected graphs $G=(V,E)$. The decomposition $V = A \cup B \cup C$ is such that each vertex in $A$ has more neighbors in $B$ than in $A$ and vice versa. $C$ is `balanced':…
This paper models games where the strategies are nodes of a graph G (we denote them as G-games) and in presence of coalition structures. The cases of one-shot and repeated games are presented. In the latter situation, coalitions are assumed…
We show that each perfect matching in a bipartite graph $G$ intersects at least half of the perfect matchings in $G$. This result has equivalent formulations in terms of the permanent of the adjacency matrix of a graph, and in terms of…