Related papers: Mean field game model of corruption

A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of…

We introduce a simple extension of the minority game in which the market rewards contrarian (resp. trend-following) strategies when it is far from (resp. close to) efficiency. The model displays a smooth crossover from a regime where…

Feedback-evolving games is a framework that models the co-evolution between payoff functions and an environmental state. It serves as a useful tool to analyze many social dilemmas such as natural resource consumption, behaviors in…

We present a simpler proof of the existence of equilibria for a class of mean field games with common noise, where players interact through the conditional law given the current value of the common noise rather than its entire path. By…

This paper presents a dynamic game framework to analyze the role of large banks in interbank markets. By extending existing models, we incorporate a large bank as a dynamic decision-maker interacting with multiple small banks. Using the…

Many real-world multi-agent or multi-task evaluation scenarios can be naturally modelled as normal-form games due to inherent strategic (adversarial, cooperative, and mixed motive) interactions. These strategic interactions may be agentic…

In a social dilemma situation, where individual and collective interests are in conflict, it sounds a reasonable assumption that the presence of super or smart players, who simultaneously punish defection and reward cooperation without…

Effects of a corrupt source on the dynamics of simultaneous move strategic games are analyzed both for classical and quantum settings. The corruption rate dependent changes in the payoffs and strategies of the players are observed. It is…

A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the…

We provide a theoretical description of the Minority Game in terms of crowd effects. The size of the fluctuations arising in the game is controlled by the interplay between crowds of like-minded agents and their anti-correlated partners…

Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical toolkit to analyse the interactions that an individual agent has in a population and how the composition of strategies in this population evolves over time. While it can provide neat solutions to…

This work tackles the problem of energy-efficient distributed power control in wireless networks with a large number of transmitters. The problem is modeled by a dynamic game. Each transmitter-receiver communication is characterized by a…

Active systems, which are driven out of equilibrium by local non-conservative forces, exhibit unique behaviors and structures with potential utility for the design of novel materials. An important and difficult challenge along the path…

We consider a system of diffusion processes that interact through their empirical mean and have a stabilizing force acting on each of them, corresponding to a bistable potential. There are three parameters that characterize the system: the…

We consider a mean field game describing the limit of a stochastic differential game of $N$-players whose state dynamics are subject to idiosyncratic and common noise and that can be absorbed when they hit a prescribed region of the state…

The minority model was introduced to study the competition between agents with limited information. It has the remarkable feature that, as the amount of information available increases, the collective gain made by the agents is reduced.…

Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…

When the interactions of agents on a network are assumed to follow the Deffuant opinion dynamics model, the outcomes are known to depend on the structure of the underlying network. This behavior cannot be captured by existing mean-field…

A theoretical model is presented which provides a way to simulate, at a very abstract level, power struggles in the social world. In the model, agents can benefit or harm each other, to varying degrees and with differing levels of…

We study the emergence of cooperation in large spatial public goods games. Without employing severe social-pressure against "defectors", or alternatively, significantly rewarding "cooperators", theoretical models typically predict a system…