Related papers: Mean field game model of corruption
We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of…
Transactions are an important aspect of human social life, and represent dynamic flow of information, intangible values, such as trust, as well as monetary and social capital. Although much research has been conducted on the nature of…
We review and develop a selection of models of systems with competition and cooperation, with origins in economics, where deep insights can be obtained by the mathematical methods of game theory. Some of these models were touched upon in…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
In this paper we study a class of matrix-valued linear-quadratic mean-field-type games for both the risk-neutral, risk-sensitive and robust cases. Non-cooperation, full cooperation and adversarial between teams are treated. We provide a…
Studying corruption presents unique challenges. Recent work in the spirit of computational social science exploits newly available data and methods to give a fresh perspective on this important topic. In this chapter we highlight some of…
The processes of interplant competition within a field are still poorly understood. However, they explain a large part of the heterogeneity in a field and may have longer-term consequences, especially in mixed stands. Modeling can help to…
In this paper, we present a model of a game among teams. Each team consists of a homogeneous population of agents. Agents within a team are cooperative while the teams compete with other teams. The dynamics and the costs are coupled through…
We consider a stationary Mean Field Games system defined on a network. In this framework, the transition conditions at the vertices play a crucial role: the ones here considered are based on the optimal control interpretation of the…
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that humans are willing to engage in costly punishment of defectors in public goods games. Based on such pieces of evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting…
We introduce a new type of Mean Field Game epidemiological models, in which subpopulations have different behavioral patterns: some are viewed as "highly rational" (choosing Nash-equilibrium long-term strategies) while others follow…
We study the mean-field limit of a generic class of dynamic co-evolving latent space networks motivated by the social and opinion dynamics literature. Such models include $n$ agents, whose opinions are given by latent stochastic processes,…
We propose a simple model of inter-bank borrowing and lending where the evolution of the log-monetary reserves of $N$ banks is described by a system of diffusion processes coupled through their drifts in such a way that stability of the…
In this paper we use a minimal model based on Mean-Field Games (a mathematical framework apt to describe situations where a large number of agents compete strategically) to simulate the scenario where a static dense human crowd is crossed…
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the…
Lattice investment projects support process model with corruption is formulated and analyzed. The model is based on the Ising lattice model of ferromagnetic but takes deal with the social phenomenon. Set of corruption agents is considered.…
We study a mathematical model to describe the evolution of a city, which is determined by the interaction of two large populations of agents, workers and firms. The map of the city is described by a network with the edges representing at…
In this paper, we use mean field games (MFGs) to investigate approximations of $N$-player games with uniformly symmetrically continuous heterogeneous closed-loop actions. To incorporate agents' risk aversion (beyond the classical expected…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
This paper studies an optimal investment-consumption problem for competitive agents with exponential or power utilities and a common finite time horizon. Each agent regards the average of habit formation and wealth from all peers as…