Related papers: Mean field game model of corruption
We introduce a mean field game for a family of filtering problems related to the classic sequential testing of the drift of a Brownian motion. To the best of our knowledge this work presents the first treatment of mean field filtering games…
Mean Field Game systems describe equilibrium configurations in differential games with infinitely many infinitesimal interacting agents. We introduce a learning procedure (similar to the Fictitious Play) for these games and show its…
Mean field games allow to describe tractable models of dynamic games with a continuum of players, explicit interaction and heterogeneous states. Thus, these models are of great interest for socio-economic applications. A particular class of…
Financial markets and more generally macro-economic models involve a large number of individuals interacting through variables such as prices resulting from the aggregate behavior of all the agents. Mean field games have been introduced to…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
Mean field game theory studies the behavior of a large number of interacting individuals in a game theoretic setting and has received a lot of attention in the past decade (Lasry and Lions, Japanese journal of mathematics, 2007). In this…
The theory of Mean Field Game of Controls considers a class of mean field games where the interaction is through the joint distribution of the state and control. It is well known that, for standard mean field games, certain monotonicity…
We review and refine the concept of a mean-field theory for the study of sandpile models, which are of central importance in the study of self-organized criticality. By considering the simple one-dimensional random walker with an absorbing…
Corruption has been an important issue as it becomes obstacle to achieve the better and more efficient economic governmental system. The paper defines corruption in two ways, as state capture and administrative corruption to grasp the…
We introduce and study a nonlinear discrete dynamical system describing the evolution of a resource distribution among interacting agents. The model generalizes several classical mean-field and opinion-dynamics frameworks and is defined on…
Subject to reasonable conditions, in large population stochastic dynamics games, where the agents are coupled by the system's mean field (i.e. the state distribution of the generic agent) through their nonlinear dynamics and their nonlinear…
An interaction system has a finite set of agents that interact pairwise, depending on the current state of the system. Symmetric decomposition of the matrix of interaction coefficients yields the representation of states by self-adjoint…
Trust serves as a fundamental pillar of human interactions, playing a crucial role in economic, social, and political relationships. While traditional models of trust primarily focus on the decision making of the first player, this paper…
We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting through an evolutionary game driven by a replicator dynamics. Strategies evolve by a replicator dynamics influenced by the position and the…
In this paper, we consider a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion where agents aim to reach a closed set, called target set, in minimal time. Congestion phenomena are modeled through a constraint on the velocity of an agent that…
We study the critical behavior of a general contagion model where nodes are either active (e.g. with opinion A, or functioning) or inactive (e.g. with opinion B, or damaged). The transitions between these two states are determined by (i)…
In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of…
We study an overlapping-generations model of community enforcement where each agent interacts once as young and once as old across two groups. After each match a minimal, directed record assigns a public "stigma" only when a player defects…
A statistical theory of the mean field is developed. It is based on the proposition that the mean field can be obtained as an energy average. Moreover, it is assumed that the matrix elements of the residual interaction, obtained after the…
The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…