Related papers: Evolutionary games on the lattice: death-birth upd…
We study a spatial, one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism's behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its choice of when to implement that strategy across a set of discrete time slots.…
Here we will use results of Cox, Durrett, and Perkins for voter model perturbations to study spatial evolutionary games on $Z^d$, $d\ge 3$ when the interaction kernel is finite range, symmetric, and has covariance matrix $\sigma^2I$. The…
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation,…
This paper studies a variant of the multi-type contact process as a model for the competition between cooperators and defectors on integer lattices. Regardless of their type, individuals die at rate one. Defectors give birth at a fixed rate…
I present the results from a spatial model of the prisoner's dilemma, played on a toroidal lattice. Each individual has a default strategy of either cooperating ($C$) or defecting ($D$). Two strategies were tested, including ``tit-for-tat''…
The evolution of cooperative behaviour is studied in the deterministic version of the Prisoners' Dilemma on a two-dimensional lattice. The payoff parameter is set at the critical region $1.8 < b < 2.0$ , where clusters of cooperators are…
The effects of an additional strategy or character called loner in the snowdrift game are studied in a well-mixed population or fully-connected network and in a square lattice. The snowdrift game, which is a possible alternative to the…
We study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that…
We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…
Synchronization, cooperation, and chaos are ubiquitous phenomena in nature. In a population composed of many distinct groups of individuals playing the prisoner's dilemma game, there exists a migration dilemma: No cooperator would migrate…
Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect…
The objective of this paper is to give a rigorous analysis of a stochastic spatial model of producer-consumer systems that has been recently introduced by Kang and the author to understand the role of space in ecological communities in…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
Evolutionary game theory studies populations that change in response to an underlying game. Often, the functional form relating outcome to player attributes or strategy is complex, preventing mathematical progress. In this work, we…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…
We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in which the players are located on the sites of two-dimensional square lattices and repeatedly have to choose one of the two strategies, either cooperation (C) or defection (D). A player…
We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one…