Related papers: Evolutionary games on the lattice: death-birth upd…
The importance of microscopic details on cooperation level is an intensively studied aspect of evolutionary game theory. Interestingly, these details become crucial on heterogeneous populations where individuals may possess diverse traits.…
We studied the effect of three strategy updating rules in coevolving prisoner's dilemma games where agents (nodes) can switch both the strategy and social partners. Under two node-based strategy updating rules, strategy updating occurs…
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and…
A new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs is proposed to extend the classical replicator equation to finite populations of players organized on a network with generic topology. Classical results from game theory,…
We present a detailed study of prisoner's dilemma game with stochastic modifications on a two-dimensional lattice, in presence of evolutionary dynamics. By very nature of the rules, the cooperators have incentive to cheat and the fear to…
Evolutionary spatial 2 x 2 games between heterogeneous agents are analyzed using different variants of cellular automata (CA). Agents play repeatedly against their nearest neighbors 2 x 2 games specified by a rescaled payoff matrix with two…
We study the evolution of cooperation in an interacting particle system with two types. The model we investigate is an extension of a two-type biased voter model. One type (called defector) has a (positive) bias $\alpha$ with respect to the…
Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is…
We propose a conformity-driven reproductive ability in which an individual $i$ is more (less) likely to imitate a neighbor $j$'s strategy if $j$'s strategy is majority (minority) in $i$'s neighborhood. The results on the evolutionary…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…
Simulating bipartite games, such as the trust game, is not straightforward due to the lack of a natural way to distinguish roles in a single population. The square lattice topology can provide a simple yet elegant solution by alternating…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation has attracted intensive scholarly interest and has been analysed within the framework of evolutionary game theory. The role of innovation, which introduces novel strategies into the population,…
In Evolutionary Dynamics the understanding of cooperative phenomena in natural and social systems has been the subject of intense research during decades. We focus attention here on the so-called "Lattice Reciprocity" mechanisms that…
We present an extensive, systematic study of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games on a square lattice under a synchronous, noiseless imitation dynamics. We show that for both the occupancy of the network and the (random) mobility of…
Cooperation is usually represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although individual self-interest may not favour cooperation, cooperation can evolve if, for example, players interact multiple times adjusting their behaviour accordingly to…
We consider a stochastic model for evolution of group-structured populations in which interactions between group members correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game. Selection operates at two organization levels: individuals…
We study a model of a spatial evolutionary game, based on the Prisoner's dilemma for two regular arrangements of players, on a square lattice and on a triangular lattice. We analyze steady state distributions of players which evolve from…
Microscopic strategy update rules play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation among interacting agents on complex networks. Many previous related works only consider one \emph{fixed} rule, while in the real world,…
In the context of Evolutionary Game Theory, one of the most noteworthy mechanisms to support cooperation is spatial reciprocity, usually accomplished by distributing players in a spatial structure allowing cooperators to cluster together…