Related papers: Frugal Bribery in Voting
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational complexity has been…
Fairness in multiwinner elections, a growing line of research in computational social choice, primarily concerns the use of constraints to ensure fairness. Recent work proposed a model to find a diverse \emph{and} representative committee…
We consider the following well-studied problem of metric distortion in social choice. Suppose we have an election with $n$ voters and $m$ candidates located in a shared metric space. We would like to design a voting rule that chooses a…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
We outline a method to estimate the value of computation for a flexible algorithm using empirical data. To determine a reasonable trade-off between cost and value, we build an empirical model of the value obtained through computation, and…
We investigate issues related to two hard problems related to voting, the optimal weighted lobbying problem and the winner problem for Dodgson elections. Regarding the former, Christian et al. [CFRS06] showed that optimal lobbying is…
In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up…
Electing leader is a vital issue not only in distributed computing but also in communication network [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], centralized mutual exclusion algorithm [6, 7], centralized control IPC, etc. A leader is required to make synchronization…
In the context of computational social choice, we study voting methods that assign a set of winners to each profile of voter preferences. A voting method satisfies the property of positive involvement (PI) if for any election in which a…
Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem. However, many of the formal approaches proposed so far have certain drawbacks including (1) computationally intractability in general, and (2)…
In reinforcement learning, robust policies for high-stakes decision-making problems with limited data are usually computed by optimizing the percentile criterion, which minimizes the probability of a catastrophic failure. Unfortunately,…
Recommender systems leverage extensive user interaction data to model preferences; however, directly modeling these data may introduce biases that disproportionately favor popular items. In this paper, we demonstrate that popularity bias…
We introduce the notion of {\em Distance Restricted Manipulation}, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win the election when their knowledge about the others' votes is a…
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable…
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is selected. Prior work has adapted popular notions of…
We consider a social choice problem where only a small number of people out of a large population are sufficiently available or motivated to vote. A common solution to increase participation is to allow voters use a proxy, that is, transfer…
Calibration weighting has been widely used to correct selection biases in non-probability sampling, missing data, and causal inference. The main idea is to calibrate the biased sample to the benchmark by adjusting the subject weights.…
Voting systems typically treat all voters equally. We argue that perhaps they should not: Voters who have supported good choices in the past should be given higher weight than voters who have supported bad ones. To develop a formal…
For many voting rules, it is NP-hard to compute a successful manipulation. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. We study empirically…
In this paper, we study some multiagent variants of the knapsack problem. Fluschnik et al. [AAAI 2019] considered the model in which every agent assigns some utility to every item. They studied three preference aggregation rules for finding…