Related papers: Frugal Bribery in Voting
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…
A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…
Systemic bias with respect to gender, race and ethnicity, often unconscious, is prevalent in datasets involving choices among individuals. Consequently, society has found it challenging to alleviate bias and achieve diversity in a way that…
Electing a leader is a classical problem in distributed computing system. Synchronization between processes often requires one process acting as a coordinator. If an elected leader node fails, the other nodes of the system need to elect…
In traditional, one-vote-per-person voting systems, privacy equates with ballot secrecy: voting tallies are published, but individual voters' choices are concealed. Voting systems that weight votes in proportion to token holdings, though,…
Many statistical problems in causal inference involve a probability distribution other than the one from which data are actually observed; as an additional complication, the object of interest is often a marginal quantity of this other…
One of the fundamental problems in crowdsourcing is the trade-off between the number of the workers needed for high-accuracy aggregation and the budget to pay. For saving budget, it is important to ensure high quality of the crowd-sourced…
We study the problem of election control through social influence when the manipulator is allowed to use the locations that she acquired on the network for sending \emph{both} positive and negative messages on \emph{multiple} candidates,…
In the United States electoral system, a candidate is elected indirectly by winning a majority of electoral votes cast by individual states, the election usually being decided by the votes cast by a small number of "swing states" where the…
Bribe demands present a social conflict scenario where decisions have wide-ranging economic and ethical consequences. Nevertheless, such incidents occur daily in many countries across the globe. Harassment bribery constitute a significant…
The Coalitional Manipulation (CM) problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the…
Peer selection, the evaluation and selection of agents by their peers, is an important problem in the field of computational social choice; with applications to grading in massively online courses (MOOCs) and academic peer review. Current…
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form of two new greedy manipulation algorithms based on intuitions…
Plurality and approval voting are two well-known voting systems with different strengths and weaknesses. In this paper we consider a new voting system we call beta(k) which allows voters to select a single first-choice candidate and approve…
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…
Peer reviews, evaluations, and selections are a fundamental aspect of modern science. Funding bodies the world over employ experts to review and select the best proposals from those submitted for funding. The problem of peer selection,…
It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But how strong is the incentive to manipulate under different…
We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investigated how proportional representation axioms from…
When solving decision and optimisation problems, many competing algorithms (model and solver choices) have complementary strengths. Typically, there is no single algorithm that works well for all instances of a problem. Automated algorithm…
By classic results in social choice theory, any reasonable preferential voting method sometimes gives individuals an incentive to report an insincere preference. The extent to which different voting methods are more or less resistant to…