Related papers: A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design without…
We study the facility location games with candidate locations from a mechanism design perspective. Suppose there are n agents located in a metric space whose locations are their private information, and a group of candidate locations for…
We focus on the problem of placing two facilities along a linear space to serve a group of agents. Each agent is committed to minimizing the distance between her location and the closest facility. A mechanism is an algorithm that maps the…
In the one-dimensional facility assignment problem, m facilities and n agents are positioned along the real line. Each agent will be assigned to a single facility to receive service. Each facility incurs a building cost, which is shared…
The facility location game has been studied extensively in mechanism design. In the classical model, each agent's cost is solely determined by her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we introduce a novel model where each…
In this paper, we propose a constrained heterogeneous facility location model where a set of alternative locations are feasible for building facilities and the number of facilities built at each location is limited. Supposing that a set of…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing function…
We consider a truthful facility location problem in which there is a set of agents with private locations on the line of real numbers, and the goal is to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those…
We study heterogeneous $k$-facility location games. In this model there are $k$ facilities where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary arbitrarily. Our goal is to design…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over the facilities. Our goal…
In this paper, we study mechanism design for single-facility location games where each agent has multiple private locations in [0, 1]. The individual objective is a satisfaction function that measures the discrepancy between the optimal…
This paper is devoted to the two-opposite-facility location games with a penalty whose amount depends on the distance between the two facilities to be opened by an authority. The two facilities are "opposite" in that one is popular and the…
We take the classic facility location problem and consider a variation, in which each agent's individual cost function is equal to their distance from the facility multiplied by a scaling factor which is determined by the facility…
In this paper, we study a truthful two-obnoxious-facility location problem, in which each agent has a private location in [0, 1] and a public optional preference over two obnoxious facilities, and there is a minimum distance constraint d…
We study a variation of facility location problems (FLPs) that aims to improve the accessibility of agents to the facility within the context of mechanism design without money. In such a variation, agents have preferences on the ideal…
In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his…
We consider a facility location game in which $n$ agents reside at known locations on a path, and $k$ heterogeneous facilities are to be constructed on the path. Each agent is adversely affected by some subset of the facilities, and is…
We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a metric space, and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms…
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of agents, each of whom is located on the line, and incurs a cost equal to his distance from the facility. An agent's location is private…