Related papers: A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design without…
We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…
We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…
The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the context of machine learning augmented algorithms, where the…
We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…
In the facility location problem, the task is to place one or more facilities so as to minimize the sum of the agent costs for accessing their nearest facility. Heretofore, in the strategic version, agent locations have been assumed to be…
We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents located on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the facility to be…
We address the problem of locating facilities on the $[0,1]$ interval based on reports from strategic agents. The cost of each agent is her distance to the closest facility, and the global objective is to minimize either the maximum cost of…
We study a truthful facility location problem where one out of $k\geq2$ available facilities must be built at a location chosen from a set of candidate ones in the interval $[0,1]$. This decision aims to accommodate a set of agents with…
Facility location problems often permit facilities to be located at any position. But what if this is not the case in practice? What if facilities can only be located at particular locations like a highway exit or close to a bus stop? We…
We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost…
We study the problem of locating a single obnoxious facility on the normalized line segment $[0,1]$ with strategic agents from a mechanism design perspective. Each agent has a preference for the undesirable location of the facility and…
We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the…
We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to locate a facility to approximately minimize the costs of…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
This paper studies the problem of minimizing group-level inequity in facility location games on the real line, where agents belong to different groups and may act strategically. We explore a fairness-oriented objective that minimizes the…
Our work is devoted to the metric facility location problem and addresses the selfish behavior of the players. It contributes to the line of work initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [EC09] on approximate mechanism design without money.…
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…
Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal…
We study a distributed facility location problem in which a set of agents, each with a private position on the real line, is partitioned into a collection of fixed, disjoint groups. The goal is to open $k$ facilities at locations chosen…
In the strategic facility location problem, a set of agents report their locations in a metric space and the goal is to use these reports to open a new facility, minimizing an aggregate distance measure from the agents to the facility.…