Related papers: Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Unce…
The goal in this paper is to approximate the Price of Stability (PoS) in stochastic Nash games using stochastic approximation (SA) schemes. PoS is amongst the most popular metrics in game theory and provides an avenue for estimating the…
We study a novel approach to information design in the standard traffic model of network congestion games. It captures the natural condition that the demand is unknown to the users of the network. A principal (e.g., a mobility service)…
We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced…
In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 4/3 and prove a matching upper bound for the price of stability,…
We consider a variation on the classical finance problem of optimal portfolio design. In our setting, a large population of consumers is drawn from some distribution over risk tolerances, and each consumer must be assigned to a portfolio of…
We investigate the problem of obtaining agreement protocols in the presence of a mobile adversary, who can control an ever-changing selection of processors. We make improvements to previous results for the case when the communications…
We consider a setting where individuals interact in a network, each choosing actions which optimize utility as a function of neighbors' actions. A central authority aiming to maximize social welfare at equilibrium can intervene by paying…
We introduce a network design game where the objective of the players is to design the interconnections between the nodes of two different networks $G_1$ and $G_2$ in order to maximize certain local utility functions. In this setting, each…
The Internet is a loose amalgamation of independent service providers acting in their own self-interest. We examine the implications of this economic reality on peering relationships. Specifically, we consider how the incentives of the…
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in…
A statistician designing an experiment wants to get as much information as possible from the data gathered. Often this means the most precise estimate possible (that is, an estimate with minimum possible variance) of the unknown parameters.…
We analyze a game-theoretic abstraction of epidemic containment played on an undirected graph $G$: each player is associated with a node in $G$ and can either acquire protection from a contagious process or risk infection. After decisions…
Federated learning is a distributed learning paradigm where multiple agents, each only with access to local data, jointly learn a global model. There has recently been an explosion of research aiming not only to improve the accuracy rates…
We consider a network topology design problem in which an initial undirected graph underlying the network is given and the objective is to select a set of edges to add to the graph to optimize the coherence of the resulting network. We show…
In general, the games are played on a host graph, where each node is a selfish independent agent (player) and each edge has a fixed link creation cost \alpha. Together the agents create a network (a subgraph of the host graph) while…
Motivated by the increasing attention to overall social benefits in networked multi-agent systems, this paper investigates an optimization problem building on noncooperative games under high-level regulation, which can be formulated in a…
Standard algorithms for finding the shortest path in a graph require that the cost of a path be additive in edge costs, and typically assume that costs are deterministic. We consider the problem of uncertain edge costs, with potential…
We study network design with a cost structure motivated by redundancy in data traffic. We are given a graph, g groups of terminals, and a universe of data packets. Each group of terminals desires a subset of the packets from its respective…
We study non-atomic congestion games on parallel-link networks with affine cost functions. We investigate the power of machine-learned predictions in the design of coordination mechanisms aimed at minimizing the impact of selfishness. Our…
Classical deterministic optimal control problems assume full information about the controlled process. The theory of control for general partially-observable processes is powerful, but the methods are computationally expensive and typically…