Related papers: Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Unce…
We consider network games where a large number of agents interact according to a network sampled from a random network model, represented by a graphon. By exploiting previous results on convergence of such large network games to graphon…
We consider protocols that serve communication requests arising over time in a wireless network that is subject to interference. Unlike previous approaches, we take the geometry of the network and power control into account, both allowing…
We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after…
We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…
The price of anarchy (PoA) has been widely used in static games to quantify the loss of efficiency due to noncooperation. Here, we extend this concept to a general differential games framework. In addition, we introduce the price of…
The problem of distributed rate maximization in multi-channel ALOHA networks is considered. First, we study the problem of constrained distributed rate maximization, where user rates are subject to total transmission probability…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
The topics treated in this thesis are inherently two-fold. The first part considers the problem of a market maker optimally setting bid/ask quotes over a finite time horizon, to maximize her expected utility. The intensities of the orders…
We investigate the behavior of a large number of selfish users that are able to switch dynamically between multiple wireless access-points (possibly belonging to different standards) by introducing an iterated non-cooperative game. Users…
Crowdsourcing has emerged as a paradigm for leveraging human intelligence and activity to solve a wide range of tasks. However, strategic workers will find enticement in their self-interest to free-ride and attack in a crowdsourcing contest…
In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For…
In this paper, we focus on graph class identification problems in the population protocol model. A graph class identification problem aims to decide whether a given communication graph is in the desired class (e.g. whether the given…
In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous traffic network with multiple users classes which differ considerably in their path selection objective. In particular, we consider two classes of users: ones who seek to minimize social cost…
This paper deals with an optimization problem over a network of agents, where the cost function is the sum of the individual objectives of the agents and the constraint set is the intersection of local constraints. Most existing methods…
The online (uniform) buy-at-bulk network design problem asks us to design a network, where the edge-costs exhibit economy-of-scale. Previous approaches to this problem used tree- embeddings, giving us randomized algorithms. Moreover, the…
We study the dominating set problem in an online setting. An algorithm is required to guarantee competitiveness against an adversary that reveals the input graph one node at a time. When a node is revealed, the algorithm learns about the…
We consider a practically motivated variant of the canonical online fair allocation problem: a decision-maker has a budget of perishable resources to allocate over a fixed number of rounds. Each round sees a random number of arrivals, and…
In this paper, we study decentralized decision-making where agents optimize private objectives under incomplete information and imperfect public monitoring, in a non-cooperative setting. By shaping utilities-embedding shadow prices or…
We study the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS) in mechanism design, in the prototypical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give bounds on the space of feasible mechanisms with respect to…
Many distributed optimization algorithms achieve existentially-optimal running times, meaning that there exists some pathological worst-case topology on which no algorithm can do better. Still, most networks of interest allow for…