Related papers: Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Unce…
In this paper, we study networks of positive linear systems subject to time-invariant and random uncertainties. We present linear matrix inequalities for checking the stability of the whole network around the origin with prescribed…
In this paper, we consider the problem of network design on network games. We study the conditions on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network to design a game such that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. We…
We consider the traffic assignment problem in nonatomic routing games where the players' cost functions may be subject to random fluctuations (e.g., weather disturbances, perturbations in the underlying network, etc.). We tackle this…
Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a well-established game-theoretic concept to shed light on coordination issues arising in open distributed systems. Leaving agents to selfishly optimize comes with the risk of ending up in sub-optimal states…
We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong…
The effective design and management of public transport systems are essential to ensure the best service for users. The performance of a transport system will depend heavily on user behaviour. In the common-lines problem approach, users…
We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…
We consider the min-cost multicast problem (under network coding) with multiple correlated sources where each terminal wants to losslessly reconstruct all the sources. We study the inefficiency brought forth by the selfish behavior of the…
Network Creation Games are a well-known approach for explaining and analyzing the structure, quality and dynamics of real-world networks like the Internet and other infrastructure networks which evolved via the interaction of selfish agents…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
We consider a largely untapped potential for the improvement of traffic networks that is rooted in the inherent uncertainty of travel times. Travel times are subject to stochastic uncertainty resulting from various parameters such as…
Network Design problems typically ask for a minimum cost sub-network from a given host network. This classical point-of-view assumes a central authority enforcing the optimum solution. But how should networks be designed to cope with…
To solve a real-world problem, the modeler usually needs to make a trade-off between model complexity and usefulness. This is also true for robust optimization, where a wide range of models for uncertainty, so-called uncertainty sets, have…
We consider the problem of designing a network of minimum cost while satisfying a prescribed survivability criterion. The survivability criterion requires that a feasible flow must still exists (i.e. all demands can be satisfied without…
In this paper we study a generalization of the classic \emph{network creation game} in the scenario in which the $n$ players sit on a given arbitrary \emph{host graph}, which constrains the set of edges a player can activate at a cost of…
We consider an atomic congestion game in which each player $i$ participates in the game with an exogenous and known probability $p_{i}\in(0,1]$, independently of everybody else, or stays out and incurs no cost. We compute the parameterized…
We consider a dynamic model for competition in a social network, where two strategic agents have fixed beliefs and the non-strategic/regular agents adjust their states according to a distributed consensus protocol. We suppose that one…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
Network creation games have been extensively studied, both from economists and computer scientists, due to their versatility in modeling individual-based community formation processes, which in turn are the theoretical counterpart of…