Related papers: Infinite games with finite knowledge gaps

We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…

Decomposition, i.e. independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be…

To predict the behavior of a population game when time becomes very long, the process that characterizes the evolution of our game dynamics must be reversible. Known games satisfying this are 2 strategy games as well as potential games with…

Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…

This paper investigates some necessary and sufficient conditions for a game to be a potential game. At first, we extend the classical results of Slade and Monderer and Shapley from games with one-dimensional action spaces to games with…

The \emph{stationary set splitting game} is a game of perfect information of length $\omega_{1}$ between two players, \unspls and \spl, in which \unspls chooses stationarily many countable ordinals and \spls tries to continuously divide…

Regular games form a well-established class of games for analysis and synthesis of reactive systems. They include coloured Muller games, McNaughton games, Muller games, Rabin games, and Streett games. These games are played on directed…

We develop methods to formally describe and compare games, in order to probe questions of game structure and design, and as a stepping stone to predicting player behavior from design patterns. We define a grammar-like formalism to describe…

We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." A recommender mechanism is one that does not have the power to…

Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…

Many problems in compositional synthesis and verification of multi-agent systems -- such as rational verification and assume-guarantee verification in probabilistic systems -- reduce to reasoning about two-player multi-objective stochastic…

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…

We study the optimal use of information in Markov games with incomplete information on one side and two states. We provide a finite-stage algorithm for calculating the limit value as the gap between stages goes to 0, and an optimal strategy…

We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…

We give an algorithm for solving stochastic parity games with almost-sure winning conditions on lossy channel systems, for the case where the players are restricted to finite-memory strategies. First, we describe a general framework, where…

A combinatorial game is a two-player game without hidden information or chance elements. The main object of combinatorial game theory is to obtain the outcome, which player has a winning strategy, of a given combinatorial game. Positions of…

We consider average-energy games, where the goal is to minimize the long-run average of the accumulated energy. While several results have been obtained on these games recently, decidability of average-energy games with a lower-bound…

The motivation for extending secret sharing schemes to cases when either the set of players is infinite or the domain from which the secret and/or the shares are drawn is infinite or both, is similar to the case when switching to abstract…

First, we consider the problem of deciding whether a nonlocal game admits a perfect entangled strategy that uses projective measurements on a maximally entangled shared state. Via a polynomial-time Karp reduction, we show that independent…

We consider a class of infinite-state stochastic games generated by stateless pushdown automata (or, equivalently, 1-exit recursive state machines), where the winning objective is specified by a regular set of target configurations and a…