Related papers: Structure and complexity of ex post efficient rand…
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive at most one. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial…
We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies ex-post non-wastefulness and…
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We explore the structure of preference profiles where ex-ante and ex-post efficiency coincide, offer a unifying…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a randomized assignment rule that - given a set of $n$ agents with strict preferences over $n$ houses - satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. For $n \le 3$,…
Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) is arguably the most well-known and widely used assignment rule. Although it returns an ex post efficient assignment, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (A new solution to the random assignment problem, J. Econ. Theory…
The problem of assigning agents to tasks is a central computational challenge in many multi-agent autonomous systems. However, in the real world, agents are not always perfect and may fail due to a number of reasons. A motivating…
This paper studies general multi-unit probabilistic assignment problems involving indivisible objects, with a particular focus on achieving the fairness notion of equal treatment of equals (ETE) and satisfying various efficiency criteria.…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…
We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random…
We investigate the problem of random assignment of indivisible goods, in which each agent has an ordinal preference and a constraint. Our goal is to characterize the conditions under which there always exists a random assignment that…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ex-ante envy-free lottery over envy-free up to one item (EF1) deterministic allocations. It has the following advantages over a recently proposed algorithm: it does not rely on the…
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the…
Voting and assignment are two of the most fundamental settings in social choice theory. For both settings, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known rule that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. Recently,…
Many real-life planning problems require making a priori decisions before all parameters of the problem have been revealed. An important special case of such problem arises in scheduling problems, where a set of tasks needs to be assigned…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings, ex-post stability is a fundamental stability concept. A…
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of social housing, the one-sided matching problem studies how a set of agents can be assigned to a set of objects when the agents have…
Consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents with strict ordinal preferences over objects, where each agent is interested in consuming at most one object, and objects have integer minimum and maximum quotas. We define an…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve compelling notions of fairness such as envy-freeness, which states that no agent should…