Related papers: Incentives-Based Mechanism for Efficient Demand Re…

In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…

This work uses Game Theory to study the effectiveness of punishments as an incentive for rational nodes to follow an epidemic dissemination protocol. The dissemination process is modeled as an infinite repetition of a stage game. At the end…

This extended abstracts presents a method to generate energy-optimal trajectories for multi-agent systems as a strategic-form game. Using recent results in optimal control, we demonstrate that an energy-optimal trajectory can be generated…

Research on promoting cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents has often focused on the bi-objective optimisation problem: minimising the total incentive cost while maximising the frequency of cooperation. However, the optimal…

Empowerment is an information-theoretic method that can be used to intrinsically motivate learning agents. It attempts to maximize an agent's control over the environment by encouraging visiting states with a large number of reachable next…

Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…

We study the design of functional incentive mechanisms for dynamical systems, in which a leader designs a fixed incentive function to motivate a self-interested follower to actuate the system beneficially over an extended horizon, without…

This paper presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to represent strategic bidding behavior in freight transport markets. Using this algorithm, we investigate whether feasible market equilibriums arise without any central…

We present a framework for analysing agent incentives using causal influence diagrams. We establish that a well-known criterion for value of information is complete. We propose a new graphical criterion for value of control, establishing…

This paper formulates a time-varying social-welfare maximization problem for distribution grids with distributed energy resources (DERs) and develops online distributed algorithms to identify (and track) its solutions. In the considered…

We consider a multi-agent delegation mechanism without money. In our model, given a set of agents, each agent has a fixed number of solutions which is exogenous to the mechanism, and privately sends a signal, e.g., a subset of solutions, to…

Fixed pickup and delivery times can strongly limit the performance of freight transportation. Against this backdrop, fleet operators can use compensation mechanisms such as monetary incentives to buy delay time from their customers, in…

We focus on the aggregation of distributed energy resources (DERs) through a profit-maximizing intermediary that enables participation of DERs in wholesale electricity markets. Particularly, we study the market efficiency brought in by the…

We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…

Maximizing utility with a budget constraint is the primary goal for advertisers in real-time bidding (RTB) systems. The policy maximizing the utility is referred to as the optimal bidding strategy. Earlier works on optimal bidding strategy…

In electrical distribution grids, the constantly increasing number of power generation devices based on renewables demands a transition from a centralized to a distributed generation paradigm. In fact, power injection from Distributed…

We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…

This paper proposes a fully distributed Demand-Side Management system for Smart Grid infrastructures, especially tailored to reduce the peak demand of residential users. In particular, we use a dynamic pricing strategy, where energy tariffs…

We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…

Suppose an agent is in a (possibly unknown) Markov Decision Process in the absence of a reward signal, what might we hope that an agent can efficiently learn to do? This work studies a broad class of objectives that are defined solely as…