Related papers: Incentives-Based Mechanism for Efficient Demand Re…
The growing penetration of renewable energy requires upgrades to the transmission network to ensure the deliverability of renewable generation. As an efficient alternative to transmission expansion, flexible transmission technologies, whose…
We study the problem of designing an optimal sequence of incentives that a principal should offer to an agent so that the agent's optimal behavior under the incentives realizes the principal's objective expressed as a temporal logic…
While microtask crowdsourcing provides a new way to solve large volumes of small tasks at a much lower price compared with traditional in-house solutions, it suffers from quality problems due to the lack of incentives. On the other hand,…
This study introduces an optimal mechanism in a dynamic stochastic knapsack environment. The model features a single seller who has a fixed quantity of a perfectly divisible item. Impatient buyers with a piece-wise linear utility function…
In societal-scale infrastructures, such as electric grids or transportation networks, pricing mechanisms are often used as a way to shape users' demand in order to lower operating costs and improve reliability. Existing approaches to…
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms that interact with strategic agents through strategic intermediaries (or mediators), and investigate the cost to society due to the mediators' strategic behavior. Selfish agents with private…
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…
Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…
We introduce the study of sequential information elicitation in strategic multi-agent systems. In an information elicitation setup a center attempts to compute the value of a function based on private information (a-k-a secrets) accessible…
Demand-Response (DR) programs, whereby users of an electricity network are encouraged by economic incentives to rearrange their consumption in order to reduce production costs, are envisioned to be a key feature of the smart grid paradigm.…
We investigate the problem of market mechanism design for wind energy. We consider a dynamic two-step model with one strategic seller with wind generation and one buyer, who trade energy through a mechanism determined by a designer. The…
We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic agent's report of the current state of the world. Both the…
This paper explores stochastic control models in the context of decarbonization within the energy market. We study three progressively complex scenarios: (1) a single firm operating with two technologies-one polluting and one clean,(2)two…
We study whether a social planner can improve the efficiency of learning, measured by the expected total welfare loss, in a sequential decision-making environment. Agents arrive in order and each makes a binary action based on their private…
Information diffusion and influence maximization are important and extensively studied problems in social networks. Various models and algorithms have been proposed in the literature in the context of the influence maximization problem. A…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
When a distributed algorithm must be executed by strategic agents with misaligned interests, a social leader needs to introduce an appropriate tax/subsidy mechanism to incentivize agents to faithfully implement the intended algorithm so…
In this paper, we examine in an abstract framework, how a tradeoff between efficiency and robustness arises in different dynamic oligopolistic market architectures. We consider a market in which there is a monopolistic resource provider and…
Consider a principal who wants to search through a space of stochastic solutions for one maximizing their utility. If the principal cannot conduct this search on their own, they may instead delegate this problem to an agent with distinct…
Mechanism design is studied for aggregating renewable power producers (RPPs) in a two-settlement power market. Employing an indirect mechanism design framework, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) is derived from the competitive equilibrium…