Related papers: Incentives-Based Mechanism for Efficient Demand Re…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
The high penetration of Renewable Energy Sources in modern smart grids necessitated the development of Demand Response (DR) mechanisms as well as corresponding innovative services for the emerging flexibility markets. From a game theoretic…
Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously…
The recent advances in artificial intelligence namely in machine learning and deep learning, have boosted the performance of intelligent systems in several ways. This gave rise to human expectations, but also created the need for a deeper…
Incentives play an important role in (security and IT) risk management of a large-scale organization with multiple autonomous divisions. This paper presents an incentive mechanism design framework for risk management based on a…
A smart grid connects wind or solar or storage farms, fossil fuel plants, industrialor commercial loads, or load serving entities, modeled as stochastic dynamical systems. In each time period, they consume or supply electrical energy, with…
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…
Algorithms are often used to produce decision-making rules that classify or evaluate individuals. When these individuals have incentives to be classified a certain way, they may behave strategically to influence their outcomes. We develop a…
We develop a dynamic multi-agent model of an interbank payment system where banks choose their level of available funds on the basis of private payoff maximisation. The model consists of the repetition of a simultaneous move stage game with…
In this paper, we propose a two-stage electricity market framework to explore the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in a day-ahead (DA) market and a real-time (RT) market. The objective is to determine the optimal bidding…
We present a general framework for training safe agents whose naive incentives are unsafe. As an example, manipulative or deceptive behaviour can improve rewards but should be avoided. Most approaches fail here: agents maximize expected…
As we transition to renewable energy sources, addressing their inflexibility during peak demand becomes crucial. It is therefore important to reduce the peak load placed on our energy system. For households, this entails spreading…
Demand Response (DR) is a program designed to match supply and demand by modifying consumption profile. Some of these programs are based on economic incentives, in which, a user is paid to reduce his energy requirements according to an…
We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making…
We propose an incentive mechanism for the sponsored content provider market in which the communication of users can be represented by a graph and the private information of the users is assumed to have a continuous distribution function.…
Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…
We consider a smart-grid connecting several agents, modeled as stochastic dynamical systems, who may be electricity consumers/producers. At each discrete time instant, which may represent a 15 minute interval, each agent may…
Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who can modify their features at a cost. A learner can only…
We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving according to a first order Markov process and is independent of the types of…
Event-triggered communication and control provide high control performance in networked control systems without overloading the communication network. However, most approaches require precise mathematical models of the system dynamics,…