Related papers: Achieving Target Equilibria in Network Routing Gam…

We consider the following question: in a nonatomic routing game, can the tolls that induce the minimum latency flow be computed without knowing the latency functions? Since the latency functions are unknown, we assume we are given an oracle…

Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic congestion games are in general inefficient as they do not induce an optimal flow that minimizes the total travel time. Network tolls are a prominent and popular way to induce an optimum flow in equilibrium.…

Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and users care about…

A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…

In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number of methods to control this average…

This paper studies the monotonicity of equilibrium costs and equilibrium loads in nonatomic congestion games, in response to variations of the demands. The main goal is to identify conditions under which a paradoxical non-monotone behavior…

We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model traffic in freight transportation, market…

We consider the traffic assignment problem in nonatomic routing games where the players' cost functions may be subject to random fluctuations (e.g., weather disturbances, perturbations in the underlying network, etc.). We tackle this…

We consider a two-player zero-sum network routing game in which a router wants to maximize the amount of legitimate traffic that flows from a given source node to a destination node and an attacker wants to block as much legitimate traffic…

This work analyzes the minimum tollbooth problem in atomic network congestion games with unsplittable flows. The goal is to place tolls on edges, such that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the tolled game that is a social optimum in…

Tolling, or congestion pricing, has emerged as an effective tool for preventing gridlock in traffic systems. However, tolls are currently mostly designed on route-based traffic assignment models (TAM), which may be unrealistic and…

The inefficiency of the Wardrop equilibrium of nonatomic routing games can be eliminated by placing tolls on the edges of a network so that the socially optimal flow is induced as an equilibrium flow. A solution where the minimum number of…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

When selfish users share a road network and minimize their individual travel costs, the equilibrium they reach can be worse than the socially optimal routing. Tolls are often used to mitigate this effect in traditional congestion games,…

We study a dynamic routing game motivated by traffic flows. The base model for an edge is the Vickrey bottleneck model. That is, edges are equipped with a free flow transit time and a capacity. When the inflow into an edge exceeds its…

In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…

Complex interactions among agents present a significant challenge for autonomous driving in real-world scenarios. Recently, a promising approach has emerged, which formulates the interactions of agents as a level-k game framework. It…

Routing games are amongst the most studied classes of games. Their two most well-known properties are that learning dynamics converge to equilibria and that all equilibria are approximately optimal. In this work, we perform a stress test…

Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…

We propose average unfairness as a new measure of fairness in routing games, defined as the ratio between the average latency and the minimum latency experienced by users. This measure is a natural complement to two existing unfairness…