Related papers: Information Relaxations and Dynamic Zero-Sum Games
We provide a formal definition of depth-limited games together with an accessible and rigorous explanation of the underlying concepts, both of which were previously missing in imperfect-information games. The definition works for an…
Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…
Dynamic games are powerful tools to model multi-agent decision-making, yet computing Nash (generalized Nash) equilibria remains a central challenge in such settings. Complexity arises from tightly coupled optimality conditions, nested…
In a noncooperative dynamic game, multiple agents operating in a changing environment aim to optimize their utilities over an infinite time horizon. Time-varying environments allow to model more realistic scenarios (e.g., mobile devices…
We consider the classic motion planning problem defined over a roadmap in which a vehicle seeks to find an optimal path from a source to a destination in presence of an attacker who can launch attacks on the vehicle over any edge of the…
This paper develops an algorithm for upper- and lower-bounding the value function for a class of linear time-varying games subject to convex control sets. In particular, a two-player zero-sum differential game is considered where the…
Although dynamic games provide a rich paradigm for modeling agents' interactions, solving these games for real-world applications is often challenging. Many real-world interactive settings involve general nonlinear state and input…
We focus on the design of algorithms for finding equilibria in 2-player zero-sum games. Although it is well known that such problems can be solved by a single linear program, there has been a surge of interest in recent years for simpler…
With the recent advances in solving large, zero-sum extensive form games, there is a growing interest in the inverse problem of inferring underlying game parameters given only access to agent actions. Although a recent work provides a…
We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…
Mixed extension has played an important role in game theory, especially in the proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic form games. Mixed extension can be regarded as continuous relaxation of a strategic form game. Recently,…
Self-serving, rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit. The two-player iterated prisoner's dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum…
One of the reasons why stochastic dynamic games with an underlying dynamic system are challenging is since strategic players have access to enormous amount of information which leads to the use of extremely complex strategies at…
We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…
Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (RL) have led to considerable progress in many 2-player zero-sum games, such as Go, Poker and Starcraft. The purely adversarial nature of such games allows for conceptually simple and…
We develop the linear programming approach to mean-field games in a general setting. This relaxed control approach allows to prove existence results under weak assumptions, and lends itself well to numerical implementation. We consider…
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
In this work, we consider the problem of a two-player zero-sum game. In the literature, the successive over-relaxation Q-learning algorithm has been developed and implemented, and it is seen to result in a lower contraction factor for the…
Zero-sum Markov Stackelberg games can be used to model myriad problems, in domains ranging from economics to human robot interaction. In this paper, we develop policy gradient methods that solve these games in continuous state and action…
Pursuit-evasion scenarios appear widely in robotics, security domains, and many other real-world situations. We focus on two-player pursuit-evasion games with concurrent moves, infinite horizon, and discounted rewards. We assume that the…