Related papers: DValue for Boolean games is EXP-complete

This paper considers the problem of two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls in finite horizon under rather weak assumptions on the cost functions ($c$ and $\chi$ not decreasing in time).…

Definable zero-sum stochastic games involve a finite number of states and action sets, reward and transition functions that are definable in an o-minimal structure. Prominent examples of such games are finite, semi-algebraic or globally…

We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn uniformly at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for…

We study a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game where one player controls the state variable via additive impulses while the other player can stop the game at any time. The main goal of this work is characterize Nash…

Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance an auction), the agents play forever. It is not necessary to consider complex examples to establish its rationality. In particular, the $0,1$-game is an extremely simple infinite game in…

Introducing the simplest of all No-Signalling Games: the RGB Game where two verifiers interrogate two provers, Alice and Bob, far enough from each other that communication between them is too slow to be possible. Each prover may be…

Our ability to know when to trust the decisions made by machine learning systems has not kept up with the staggering improvements in their performance, limiting their applicability in high-stakes domains. We introduce Prover-Verifier Games…

Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…

Simple stochastic games can be solved by value iteration (VI), which yields a sequence of under-approximations of the value of the game. This sequence is guaranteed to converge to the value only in the limit. Since no stopping criterion is…

In Zeng et al. [Fluct. Noise Lett. 7 (2007) L439--L447] the analysis of the lowest unique positive integer game is simplified by some reasonable assumptions that make the problem tractable for arbitrary numbers of players. However, here we…

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is bounded below, then its core is non-empty if and only if the…

This short note demonstrates how one can define a transformation of a non-zero sum game into a zero sum, so that the optimal mixed strategy achieving equilibrium always exists. The transformation is equivalent to introduction of a passive…

We investigate the value of parallel repetition of one-round games with any number of players $k\ge 2$. It has been an open question whether an analogue of Raz's Parallel Repetition Theorem holds for games with more than two players, i.e.,…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

Escalation in games is when agents keep playing forever. Based on formal proofs we claim that if agents assume that resource are infinite, escalation is rational.

Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called \emph{bidding games}, showing the existence…

Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…

We investigate the computational complexity of deciding whether k cops can capture a robber on a graph G. In 1995, Goldstein and Reingold conjectured that the problem is EXPTIME-complete when both G and k are part of the input; we prove…

Bayesian regression games are a special class of two-player general-sum Bayesian games in which the learner is partially informed about the adversary's objective through a Bayesian prior. This formulation captures the uncertainty in regard…

We consider discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we come up with a pair of…