Related papers: Knightian Robustness of Single-Parameter Domains

We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated…

We study an evolutionary game of chance in which the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., heads or tails) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. The game is perhaps the simplest possible probabilistic game in which…

We consider the problem of estimating `preference' or `strength' parameters in three-way comparison experiments, each composed of a series of paired comparisons, but where only the single `preferred' or `strongest' candidate is known in…

We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. Under the sole assumption of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes - we show that every protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive…

We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present. Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by {\em…

We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable…

This paper introduces two fundamentally new concepts to game theory: multilateral Nash equilibria and families of games. Starting with non-cooperative games, we show how these notions together seamlessly integrate into and naturally extend…

Studying continuous time counterpart of some discrete time dynamics is now a standard and fruitful technique, as some properties hold in both setups. In game theory, this is usually done by considering differential games on Euclidean…

We consider a two-person trading game in continuous time whereby each player chooses a constant rebalancing rule $b$ that he must adhere to over $[0,t]$. If $V_t(b)$ denotes the final wealth of the rebalancing rule $b$, then Player 1 (the…

We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…

We introduce three measures which quantify the degree to which quantum systems possess the robustness exhibited by classical systems when subjected to continuous observation. Using these we show that for a fixed environmental interaction…

Ensuring robust decision-making in multi-agent systems is challenging when agents have distinct, possibly conflicting objectives and lack full knowledge of each other's strategies. This is apparent in safety-critical applications such as…

A model of Boolean game with only one free parameter $p$ that denotes the strength of herd behavior is proposed where each agent acts according to the information obtained from his neighbors in network and those in the minority are…

Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes: one player represents the controller, trying to ensure a given specification, and the other represents a hostile environment. The evolution of the system…

For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are…

We consider agents in a social network competing to be selected as partners in collaborative, mutually beneficial activities. We study this through a model in which an agent i can initiate a limited number k_i>0 of games and selects the…

I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…

This paper investigates a class of multi-player discrete games where each player aims to maximize its own utility function. Each player does not know the other players' action sets, their deployed actions or the structures of its own or the…

From the standpoint of game theory, dominoes is a game that has not received much attention (specially the variety known as draw). It is usually thought that this game is already solved, given general results in game theory. However, the…

In open-world environments, artificial agents must often contend with novel conditions that deviate from their training or design assumptions. This paper studies the robustness of fixed-strategy agents to such novelty within the setting of…