Related papers: Knightian Robustness of Single-Parameter Domains

We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely…

Classical reinforcement learning assumes the agent interacts with a fixed environment whose behavior does not depend on the agent's policy. This assumption breaks down in non-realizable settings where other actors might anticipate the…

In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…

The numeraire portfolio in a financial market is the unique positive wealth process that makes all other nonnegative wealth processes, when deflated by it, supermartingales. The numeraire portfolio depends on market characteristics, which…

We study a dynamical system defined by a repeated game on a 1D lattice, in which the players keep track of their gross payoffs over time in a bank. Strategy updates are governed by a Boltzmann distribution which depends on the neighborhood…

We consider an example of cyclic competition bimatrix game which is a Rock-Scissors-Paper game with assumption about perfect memory of the playing agents. At first we investigate the dynamics in the neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium as…

We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In this dynamics, a belief estimate of the parameter is repeatedly updated given players' strategies and realized…

We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean…

Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…

In hedonic games, players form coalitions based on individual preferences over the group of players they could belong to. Several concepts to describe the stability of coalition structures in a game have been proposed and analysed in the…

Strategies for sustaining cooperation and preventing exploitation by selfish agents in repeated games have mostly been restricted to Markovian strategies where the response of an agent depends on the actions in the previous round. Such…

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…

We study a quantum game played by two players with restricted multiple strategies. It is found that in this restricted quantum game Nash equilibrium does not always exist when the initial state is entangled. At the same time, we find that…

We study the effects of randomness on competitions based on an elementary random process in which there is a finite probability that a weaker team upsets a stronger team. We apply this model to sports leagues and sports tournaments, and…

Indirect reciprocity is one of the main mechanisms to explain the emergence and sustainment of altruism in societies. The standard approach to indirect reciprocity are reputation models. These are games in which players base their decisions…

We study the computational complexity of an important property of simple, regular and weighted games, which is decisiveness. We show that this concept can naturally be represented in the context of hypergraph theory, and that decisiveness…

Cooperative systems often remain in persistently suboptimal yet stable states. This paper explains such "rational stagnation" as an equilibrium sustained by a rational adversary whose utility follows the principle of potential loss, $u_{D}…

We study a portfolio optimization problem for competitive agents with CRRA utilities and a common finite time horizon. The utility of an agent depends not only on her absolute wealth and consumption but also on her relative wealth and…

In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…

A Bayesian player acting in an infinite multi-player game learns to predict the other players' strategies if his prior assigns positive probability to their play (or contains a grain of truth). Kalai and Lehrer's classic grain of truth…