Related papers: Strategic Argumentation is NP-Complete
The Poison Game is a two-player game played on a graph in which one player can influence which edges the other player is able to traverse. It operationalizes the notion of existence of credulously admissible sets in an argumentation…
Stochastic games are a convenient formalism for modelling systems that comprise rational agents competing or collaborating within uncertain environments. Probabilistic model checking techniques for this class of models allow us to formally…
Games offer a compelling paradigm for developing general reasoning capabilities in language models, as they naturally demand strategic planning, probabilistic inference, and adaptive decision-making. However, existing self-play approaches…
Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal…
We study computational problems arising from the iterated removal of weakly dominated actions in anonymous games. Our main result shows that it is NP-complete to decide whether an anonymous game with three actions can be solved via iterated…
In many applications, we want to influence the decisions of independent agents by designing incentives for their actions. We revisit a fundamental problem in this area, called GAME IMPLEMENTATION: Given a game in standard form and a set of…
An important skill in critical thinking and argumentation is the ability to spot and recognize fallacies. Fallacious arguments, omnipresent in argumentative discourse, can be deceptive, manipulative, or simply leading to `wrong moves' in a…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
Coalition Logic is a central logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In a recent paper, Li and Ju argued that generally, models of Coalition Logic, concurrent game models, have three too strong assumptions: seriality, independence…
This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In…
Strategic decision-making involves interactive reasoning where agents adapt their choices in response to others, yet existing evaluations of large language models (LLMs) often emphasize Nash Equilibrium (NE) approximation, overlooking the…
We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equilibria in games with a massive number of players. So far, the only known game instances in which the problem is solved in polynomial time are some particular congestion games. However, a…
In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash…
In many combinatorial games, one can prove that the first player wins under best play using a simple but non-constructive argument called strategy-stealing. This work is about the complexity behind these proofs: how hard is it to actually…
We define a game semantics for second order classical arithmetic PA2 (with quantifiers over predicates on integers and full comprehension axiom). Our semantics is effective: moves are described by a finite amount of information and whenever…
In this paper, we discuss a class of two-stage hierarchical games with multiple leaders and followers, which is called Nash-Stackelberg-Nash (N-S-N) games. Particularly, we consider N-S-N games under decision-dependent uncertainties (DDUs).…
The rule "defeated(X) $\leftarrow$ attacks(Y,X), $\neg$ defeated(Y)" states that an argument is defeated if it is attacked by an argument that is not defeated. The rule "win(X) $\leftarrow$ move(X,Y), $\neg$ win(Y)" states that in a game a…
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…
Rational verification is the problem of determining which temporal logic properties will hold in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents in the system act rationally, by choosing strategies that collectively form a…
Large language models (LLMs) have been extensively used as the backbones for general-purpose agents, and some economics literature suggest that LLMs are capable of playing various types of economics games. Following these works, to overcome…