Related papers: Robust Equilibria in Concurrent Games
In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these…
We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the…
We introduce robust learning equilibrium. The idea of learning equilibrium is that learning algorithms in multi-agent systems should themselves be in equilibrium rather than only lead to equilibrium. That is, learning equilibrium is immune…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
We consider concurrent games played by two-players on a finite-state graph, where in every round the players simultaneously choose a move, and the current state along with the joint moves determine the successor state. We study a…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
Continuous games are multiplayer games in which strategy sets are compact and utility functions are continuous. These games typically have a highly complicated structure of Nash equilibria, and numerical methods for the equilibrium…
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…
We propose a distributed algorithm to compute an equilibrium in aggregate games where players communicate over a fixed undirected network. Our algorithm exploits correlated perturbation to obfuscate information shared over the network. We…
In a mean-payoff parity game, one of the two players aims both to achieve a qualitative parity objective and to minimize a quantitative long-term average of payoffs (aka. mean payoff). The game is zero-sum and hence the aim of the other…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
We consider two-player games played on weighted directed graphs with mean-payoff and total-payoff objectives, two classical quantitative objectives. While for single-dimensional games the complexity and memory bounds for both objectives…
In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…
We investigate the problem of learning an equilibrium in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents can adaptively choose their actions based on their assigned matches. Specifically, we consider a setting in which matched agents…
In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we…
This paper considers a class of experimentation games with L\'{e}vy bandits encompassing those of Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). Its main result is that efficient (perfect Bayesian) equilibria exist whenever…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…