Related papers: Robust Equilibria in Concurrent Games

Automated game balancing has often focused on single-agent scenarios. In this paper we present a tool for balancing multi-player games during game design. Our approach requires a designer to construct an intuitive graphical representation…

Is there an equilibrium for distributed consensus when all agents except one collude to steer the decision value towards their preference? If an equilibrium exists, then an $n-1$ size coalition cannot do better by deviating from the…

We study the complexity of deciding the existence of mixed equilibria for minimization games where players use valuations other than expectation to evaluate their costs. We consider risk-averse players seeking to minimize the sum…

In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon discounted dynamic mean-field games where there is a large population of homogeneous players sequentially making strategic decisions and each player is affected by other players…

We study graphs and two-player games in which rewards are assigned to states, and the goal of the players is to satisfy or dissatisfy certain property of the generated outcome, given as a mean payoff property. Since the notion of…

Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…

We propose a novel algorithm for the solution of mean-payoff games that merges together two seemingly unrelated concepts introduced in the context of parity games, small progress measures and quasi dominions. We show that the integration of…

We investigate the problem of equilibrium computation for "large" $n$-player games. Large games have a Lipschitz-type property that no single player's utility is greatly affected by any other individual player's actions. In this paper, we…

We establish the existence and uniqueness of distributed equilibria to possibly nonsymmetric $N$ player differential games with interactions through controls under displacement semimonotonicity assumptions. Surprisingly, the nonseparable…

Quantum entanglement has been recently demonstrated as a useful resource in conflicting interest games of incomplete information between two players, Alice and Bob [Pappa et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015)]. General setting for…

We consider multiplayer stochastic games in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the technique of Martin (1998) and Maitra and Sudderth (1998), we show…

In this paper we consider strong Nash equilibria, in mixed strategies, for finite games. Any strong Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient for each coalition. First, we analyze the two--player setting. Our main result, in its simplest…

Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

Rating strategies in a game is an important area of research in game theory and artificial intelligence, and can be applied to any real-world competitive or cooperative setting. Traditionally, only transitive dependencies between strategies…

This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…

The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a…

One of the proposed solutions to the equilibrium selection problem for agents learning in repeated games is obtained via the notion of stochastic stability. Learning algorithms are perturbed so that the Markov chain underlying the learning…