Related papers: Language-based Games
Understanding human behaviour in decision problems and strategic interactions has wide-ranging applications in economics, psychology, and artificial intelligence. Game theory offers a robust foundation for this understanding, based on the…
In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…
Generative artificial intelligence (Generative AI), and in particular Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained significant popularity among researchers and industrial communities, paving the way for integrating LLMs in different domains,…
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…
Game semantics has been used with considerable success in formulating fully abstract semantics for languages with higher-order procedures and a wide range of computational effects. Recently, nominal games have been proposed for modelling…
We relate here two formalisms that are used for different purposes in reasoning about multi-agent systems. One of them are strategic games that are used to capture the idea that agents interact with each other while pursuing their own…
We extend the study of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) from Nash strategic games to a class of qualitative games. Also in this case, the IESDS process leads us to a kind of 'rationalizable' result. We…
Referential games and reconstruction games are the most common game types for studying emergent languages. We investigate how the type of the language game affects the emergent language in terms of: i) language compositionality and ii)…
We study learning in complete-information games, allowing the players' models of their environment to be misspecified. We introduce Berk--Nash rationalizability: the largest self-justified set of actions -- meaning each action in the set is…
We propose a new General Game Playing (GGP) language called Regular Boardgames (RBG), which is based on the theory of regular languages. The objective of RBG is to join key properties as expressiveness, efficiency, and naturalness of the…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
As a contribution to the challenge of building game-playing AI systems, we develop and analyse a formal language for representing and reasoning about strategies. Our logical language builds on the existing general Game Description Language…
The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the players. However, in many cases, games played by human players have outcomes very different from Nash…
In a society of completely selfish individuals where everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, does any equilibrium exist for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that…
We review the literature on models that try to explain human behavior in social interactions described by normal-form games with monetary payoffs. We start by covering social and moral preferences. We then focus on the growing body of…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
Our paper addresses characterizing conditions for a linear quadratic (LQ) game to be a potential game. The desired properties of potential games in finite action settings, such as convergence of learning dynamics to Nash equilibria, and the…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…