Related papers: The Shapley Axiomatization for Values in Partition…
The Shapley value (SV) is adopted in various scenarios in machine learning (ML), including data valuation, agent valuation, and feature attribution, as it satisfies their fairness requirements. However, as exact SVs are infeasible to…
In 1964 Shapley devised a family of games for which fictitious play fails to converge to Nash equilibrium. The games are two-player non-zero-sum with 3 pure strategies per player. Shapley assumed that each player played a specific pure…
This paper makes the case for using Shapley value to quantify the importance of random input variables to a function. Alternatives based on the ANOVA decomposition can run into conceptual and computational problems when the input variables…
We investigate the distribution of the well-studied Shapley--Shubik values in weighted voting games where the agents are stochastically determined. The Shapley--Shubik value measures the voting power of an agent, in typical collective…
We propose a variant of the Shapley value, the group Shapley value, to interpret counterfactual simulations in structural economic models by quantifying the importance of different components. Our framework compares two sets of parameters,…
We consider a multi-organizational system in which each organization contributes processors to the global pool but also jobs to be processed on the common resources. The fairness of the scheduling algorithm is essential for the stability…
We study the notion of efficiency for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. In such games, the grand coalition $[n]$ may be forbidden, and, thus, it is a non-trivial problem to study the total number of payoff $v_{\Delta}$ of a…
We consider Young (1985)'s characterization of the Shapley value, and give a new proof of this axiomatization. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value works on various…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
The Shapley value was originally introduced in cooperative game theory as a wealth distribution mechanism. It has since found use in knowledge representation and databases for the purpose of assigning scores to formulas and database tuples…
The Shapley value is a conventional and well-studied function for determining the contribution of a player to the coalition in a cooperative game. Among its applications in a plethora of domains, it has recently been proposed to use the…
We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…
Matching games naturally generalize assignment games, a well-known class of cooperative games. Interest in matching games has grown recently due to some breakthrough results and new applications. This state-of-the-art survey provides an…
We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…
A popular explainable AI (XAI) approach to quantify feature importance of a given model is via Shapley values. These Shapley values arose in cooperative games, and hence a critical ingredient to compute these in an XAI context is a…
We show that $\varepsilon$-additive approximations of the optimal value of fixed-size two-player free games with fixed-dimensional entanglement assistance can be computed in time $\mathrm{poly}(1/\varepsilon)$. This stands in contrast to…
Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…
Shapley values have emerged as a central game-theoretic tool in explainable AI (XAI). However, computing Shapley values exactly requires $2^d$ game evaluations for a model with $d$ features. Lundberg and Lee's KernelSHAP algorithm has…
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…
We consider an investment process that includes a number of features, each of which can be active or inactive. Our goal is to attribute or decompose an achieved performance to each of these features, plus a baseline value. There are many…