Related papers: Finding Optimal Strategies in a Multi-Period Multi…
This paper is devoted to a Stackelberg stochastic differential game for a linear mean-field type stochastic differential system with a mean-field type quadratic cost functional in finite horizon. The coefficients in the state equation and…
We propose a single-level numerical approach to solve Stackelberg mean field game (MFG) problems. In Stackelberg MFG, an infinite population of agents play a non-cooperative game and choose their controls to optimize their individual…
Social media platforms are ecosystems in which many decisions are constantly made for the benefit of the creators in order to maximize engagement, which leads to a maximization of income. The decisions, ranging from collaboration to public…
We study a Stackelberg strategy subject to the evolutionary linearized micropolar fluids equations in domains with moving boundaries, considering a Nash multi-objective equilibrium (non necessarily cooperative) for the "follower players"…
We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…
This paper formulates a Stackelberg game between a coordination agent and participating homes to control the overall load consumption of a residential neighborhood. Each home optimizes a comfort-cost trade off to determine a load schedule…
We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…
We discuss an open-loop backward Stackelberg differential game involving single leader and single follower. Unlike most Stackelberg game literature, the state to be controlled is characterized by a backward stochastic differential equation…
Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…
We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
This paper analyzes a class of Stackelberg games where different actors compete for shared resources and a central authority tries to balance the demand through a pricing mechanism. Situations like this can for instance occur when fleet…
This paper studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg type where…
Stackelberg games (SGs) constitute the most fundamental and acclaimed models of strategic interactions involving some form of commitment. Moreover, they form the basis of more elaborate models of this kind, such as, e.g., Bayesian…
A Stackelberg Vertex Cover game is played on an undirected graph $\mathcal{G}$ where some of the vertices are under the control of a \emph{leader}. The remaining vertices are assigned a fixed weight. The game is played in two stages. First,…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…
This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…
We study incentive designs for a class of stochastic Stackelberg games with one leader and a large number of (finite as well as infinite population of) followers. We investigate whether the leader can craft a strategy under a dynamic…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
A Stackelberg duopoly model in which two firms compete to maximize their market share is considered. The firms offer a service/product to customers that are spread over several geographical regions (e.g., countries, provinces, or states).…