Related papers: Double-interval societies
In approval voting, individuals vote for all platforms that they find acceptable. In this situation it is natural to ask: When is agreement possible? What conditions guarantee that some fraction of the voters agree on even a single…
In the system of approval voting, individuals vote for all candidates they find acceptable. Many approval voting situations can be modeled geometrically, and thus geometric concepts such as the piercing number have a natural interpretation.…
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explore which (if any) fairness guarantees can be provided under…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
Most social choice rules assume access to full rankings, while current alignment practice -- despite aiming for diversity -- typically treats voters as anonymous and comparisons as independent, effectively extracting only about one bit per…
I examine the mean consensus time (i.e., exit time) of the voter model in the so-called two-clique graph. The two-clique graph is composed of two cliques interconnected by some links and considered as a toy model of networks with community…
We examine the following voting situation. A committee of $k$ people is to be formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the committee will submit a list of $j$ candidates that they would prefer to be on the committee. We…
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict…
We have found that known community identification algorithms produce inconsistent communities when the node ordering changes at input. We propose two metrics to quantify the level of consistency across multiple runs of an algorithm:…
We analyze Assessment Voting, a new two-round voting procedure that can be applied to binary decisions in democratic societies. In the first round, a randomly-selected number of citizens cast their vote on one of the two alternatives at…
The statistical properties of pairwise majority voting over S alternatives is analyzed in an infinite random population. We first compute the probability that the majority is transitive (i.e. that if it prefers A to B to C, then it prefers…
A survey can be represented by a bipartite network as it has two types of nodes, participants and items in which participants can only interact with items. We introduce an agreement threshold to take a minimal projection of the participants…
We analyse two-tier voting systems with voters described by a multi-group mean-field model that allows for correlated voters both within groups as well as across group boundaries. In this model voters are influenced by voters within their…
We consider distributed plurality consensus in a complete graph of size $n$ with $k$ initial opinions. We design an efficient and simple protocol in the asynchronous communication model that ensures that all nodes eventually agree on the…
Decision-making processes often involve voting. Human interactions with exogenous entities such as legislations or products can be effectively modeled as two-mode (bipartite) signed networks-where people can either vote positively,…
We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting…