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Interconnected agents such as firms in a supply chain make simultaneous preparatory investments to increase chances of honouring their respective bilateral agreements. Failures cascade: if one fails their agreement, then so do all who…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
A broad current application of algorithms is in formal and quantitative measures of murky concepts -- like merit -- to make decisions. When people strategically respond to these sorts of evaluations in order to gain favorable decision…
We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions…
In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…
In the classical principal-agent hidden-action contract model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. In order to complete the task, the agent chooses an action from a set of actions, where each potential action…
Consider a multi-agent systems setup in which a principal (a supervisor agent) assigns subtasks to specialized agents and aggregates their responses into a single system-level output. A core property of such systems is information…
Control of multi-agent systems via game theory is investigated. Assume a system level object is given, the utility functions for individual agents are designed to convert a multi-agent system into a potential game. First, for fixed…
Game-theoretic approaches are envisioned to bring human-like reasoning skills and decision-making processes for autonomous vehicles (AVs). However, challenges including game complexity and incomplete information still remain to be addressed…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise as decision-makers in dynamic settings, but their stateless nature necessitates creating a natural language representation of history. We present a unifying framework for systematically…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
This work suggests modifications to a previously introduced class of heterogeneous agent models that allow for the inclusion of different types of agent motivations and behaviours in a unified way. The agents operate within a highly…
Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal…
The task of managing general game playing in a multi-agent system is the problem addressed in this paper. It is considered to be done by an agent. There are many reasons for constructing such an agent, called general game management agent.…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
Route controlled autonomous vehicles could have a significant impact in reducing congestion in the future. Before applying multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms to route control, we can model the system using a congestion game to…
Smart balancing, also called passive balancing, is the intentional introduction of active power schedule deviations by balance responsible parties (BRPs) to receive a remuneration through the imbalance settlement mechanism. From a system…
We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which…
This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. We introduce a framework in which agents' knowledge is represented as a set of payoff comparisons they can make, and use it to…