Related papers: Coalitional Manipulation for Schulze's Rule
Determining how close a winner of an election is to becoming a loser, or distinguishing between different possible winners of an election, are major problems in computational social choice. We tackle these problems for so-called weighted…
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These…
We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that…
Single-peakedness is one of the most important and well-known domain restrictions on preferences. The computational study of single-peaked electorates has largely been restricted to elections with tie-free votes, and recent work that…
Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries toaffect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent is to make a specific candidate either win…
We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random…
The Sznajd model in less than a year has found several followers. An isolated person does not convince others; a group of people sharing the same opinions influences the neighbours much more easily. Thus on a square lattice, with variables…
In this paper, we consider permutation manipulations by any subset of women in the men-proposing version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This paper is motivated by the college admissions process in China. Our results also answer an open…
We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…
The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically select a winner in an election among more than two candidates; the only definite collective preferences are between individual pairs of…
The important Kemeny problem, which consists of computing median consensus rankings of an election with respect to the Kemeny voting rule, admits important applications in biology and computational social choice and was generalized recently…
A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control,…
False-name manipulation refers to the question of whether a player in a weighted voting game can increase her power by splitting into several players and distributing her weight among these false identities. Analogously to this splitting…
We study the properties of elections that have a given position matrix (in such elections each candidate is ranked on each position by a number of voters specified in the matrix). We show that counting elections that generate a given…
We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our…
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are selected. Aziz et al. (2015) proposed two representation axioms called justified…
We consider two-tier voting system and try to determine optimal weights for a fair representation in such systems. A prominent example of such a voting system is the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Under the assumption of…
We study the complexity of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. The goal of constructive candidate control is to ensure that a given candidate wins by either adding or deleting candidates from the election (in the…
In many applications of cooperative game theory -- from corporate governance and cartel formation to parliamentary voting -- not all winning coalitions are feasible. Ideological distances, institutional constraints, or pre-electoral…