Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty
Computer Science and Game Theory
2015-09-09 v1 Multiagent Systems
Abstract
We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding which alternatives can possibly win is NP-hard for both procedures. Whilst deciding if an alternative necessarily wins is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1509.02424,
title = {Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty},
author = {Robert Bredereck and Jiehua Chen and Rolf Niedermeier and Toby Walsh},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1509.02424},
year = {2015}
}