Related papers: Computing with voting trees
We consider election scenarios with incomplete information, a situation that arises often in practice. There are several models of incomplete information and accordingly, different notions of outcomes of such elections. In one well-studied…
Given a graph $G = (V,E)$ where every vertex has a weak ranking over its neighbors, we consider the problem of computing an optimal matching as per agent preferences. Classical notions of optimality such as stability and its relaxation…
Democracy relies on making collective decisions through voting. In addition, voting procedures have further applications, for example in the training of artificial intelligence. An essential criterion for determining the winner of a fair…
In the famous network creation game of Fabrikant et al. a set of agents play a game to build a connected graph. The $n$ agents form the vertex set $V$ of the graph and each vertex $v\in V$ buys a set $E_v$ of edges inducing a graph…
Packing graphs is a combinatorial problem where several given graphs are being mapped into a common host graph such that every edge is used at most once. In the planar tree packing problem we are given two trees T1 and T2 on n vertices and…
Sumner's universal tournament conjecture states that any tournament on $2n-2$ vertices contains a copy of any directed tree on $n$ vertices. We prove an asymptotic version of this conjecture, namely that any tournament on $(2+o(1))n$…
The problem of electing a leader from among $n$ contenders is one of the fundamental questions in distributed computing. In its simplest formulation, the task is as follows: given $n$ processors, all participants must eventually return a…
Computational Social Choice (ComSoc) is a rapidly developing field at the intersection of computer science, economics, social choice, and political science. The study of tournaments is fundamental to ComSoc and many results have been…
We consider a voting setting where candidates have preferences about the outcome of the election and are free to join or leave the election. The corresponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has…
Drafting strong players is crucial for the team success. We describe a new data-driven interpretable approach for assessing draft prospects in the National Hockey League. Successful previous approaches have built a predictive model based on…
In the context of voting with ranked ballots, an important class of voting rules is the class of margin-based rules (also called pairwise rules). A voting rule is margin-based if whenever two elections generate the same head-to-head margins…
Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule…
Decision trees are widely used for non-linear modeling, as they capture interactions between predictors while producing inherently interpretable models. Despite their popularity, performing inference on the non-linear fit remains largely…
We revisit the recent breakthrough result of Gkatzelis et al. on (single-winner) metric voting, which showed that the optimal distortion of 3 can be achieved by a mechanism called Plurality Matching. The rule picks an arbitrary candidate…
A fundamental component of networking infras- tructure is the policy, used in routing tables and firewalls. Accordingly, there has been extensive study of policies. However, the theory of such policies indicates that the size of the…
We consider a spatial voting model where both candidates and voters are positioned in the $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their proximity to the voter's ideal point. We focus on the scenario where…
We prove that every Condorcet-consistent voting rule can be manipulated by a voter who completely reverses their preference ranking, assuming that there are at least 4 alternatives. This corrects an error and improves a result of [Sanver,…
We consider the following combinatorial two-player game: On the random tree arising from a branching process, each round one player (Breaker) deletes an edge and by that removes the descendant and all its progeny, while the other (Maker)…
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…
In distortion-based analysis of social choice rules over metric spaces, one assumes that all voters and candidates are jointly embedded in a common metric space. Voters rank candidates by non-decreasing distance. The mechanism, receiving…