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The probability of a given candidate winning a future election is worked out in closed form as a function of (i) the current support rates for each candidate, (ii) the relative positioning of the candidates within the political spectrum,…
The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically select a winner in an election among more than two candidates; the only definite collective preferences are between individual pairs of…
We consider distributed plurality consensus in a complete graph of size $n$ with $k$ initial opinions. We design an efficient and simple protocol in the asynchronous communication model that ensures that all nodes eventually agree on the…
We design a distributed algorithm to seek generalized Nash equilibria of a robust game with uncertain coupled constraints. Due to the uncertainty of parameters in set constraints, we aim to find a generalized Nash equilibrium in the worst…
The wisdom of the crowd has long become the de facto approach for eliciting information from individuals or experts in order to predict the ground truth. However, classical democratic approaches for aggregating individual \emph{votes} only…
Many societal decision problems lie in high-dimensional continuous spaces not amenable to the voting techniques common for their discrete or single-dimensional counterparts. These problems are typically discretized before running an…
Consensus protocols play an important role in the study of distributed algorithms. In this paper, we study the effect of bias on two popular consensus protocols, namely, the {\em voter rule} and the {\em 2-choices rule} with binary…
We study a generic framework that provides a unified view on two important classes of problems: (i) extensions of the k-median problem where clients are interested in having multiple facilities in their vicinity (e.g., due to the fact that,…
In this paper, we present a novel consensus-based zeroth-order algorithm tailored for non-convex multiplayer games. The proposed method leverages a metaheuristic approach using concepts from swarm intelligence to reliably identify global…
We investigate majority rule dynamics in a population with two classes of people, each with two opinion states $\pm 1$, and with tunable interactions between people in different classes. In an update, a randomly selected group adopts the…
We study low sample complexity mechanisms in participatory budgeting (PB), where each voter votes for a preferred allocation of funds to various projects, subject to project costs and total spending constraints. We analyze the distortion…
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…
Several cases of the Sznajd model of socio-physics, that only a group of people sharing the same opinion can convince their neighbors, have been simulated on a more realistic network with a stronger clustering. In addition, many opinions,…
A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal utility functions over the alternatives, but voting rules have…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…
Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters…
We consider a social choice problem where only a small number of people out of a large population are sufficiently available or motivated to vote. A common solution to increase participation is to allow voters use a proxy, that is, transfer…
We consider voting on multiple independent binary issues. In addition, a weighting vector for each voter defines how important they consider each issue. The most natural way to aggregate the votes into a single unified proposal is…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…