Related papers: Evolutionary instability of Zero Determinant strat…
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…
The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…
Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied . Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case of…
We define a new strategy for population games based on techniques from machine learning and statistical inference that is essentially uninvadable and can successfully invade (significantly more likely than a neutral mutant) essentially all…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…
Since the introduction of zero-determinant strategies, extortionate strategies have received considerable interest. While an interesting class of strategies, the definitions of extortionate strategies are algebraically rigid, apply only to…
Moving Target Defense (MTD) is commonly formulated as a repeated security game to mitigate persistent threats. Although the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) characterizes the defender's optimal strategy in the leader-follower framework,…
We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…
This paper focuses on the performance of equalizer zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in discounted repeated Stackerberg asymmetric games. In the leader-follower adversarial scenario, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) deriving from the…
Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a…
An oligopoly is a market in which the price of goods is controlled by a few firms. Cournot introduced the simplest game-theoretic model of oligopoly, where profit-maximizing behavior of each firm results in market failure. Furthermore, when…
Researchers have explored the performance of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies for decades, from the celebrated performance of Tit for Tat to the introduction of the zero-determinant strategies and the use of sophisticated learning…
We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…
In an iterated two-person game, for instance prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game, there exist strategies that force the payoffs of the opponents to be equal. These equalizer strategies form a subset of the more general zero-determinant…
We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the…
In the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but,…
In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the…
Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even…
Controlling payoffs in repeated games is one of the important topics in control theory of multi-agent systems. Recently proposed zero-determinant strategies enable players to unilaterally enforce linear relations between payoffs.…