On stability in dynamical Prisoner's dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates
Populations and Evolution
2011-03-29 v1
Abstract
Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied . Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case of coexistence between cooperators and defectors .If r1,r3 -> infinity cooperation is the dominant strategy and defectors can no longer exploit cooperators.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1103.5150,
title = {On stability in dynamical Prisoner's dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates},
author = {M. I. Shehata},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1103.5150},
year = {2011}
}