Related papers: Non-cooperative games with preplay negotiations
Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to…
AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay…
Iterated bipartite quantum games are implemented in terms of the discrete-time quantum walk on the line. Our proposal allows for conditional strategies, as two rational agents make a choice from a restricted set of two-qubit unitary…
Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the…
The Robinson-Goforth topology of swaps in adjoining payoffs elegantly arranges 2x2 ordinal games in accordance with important properties including symmetry, number of dominant strategies and Nash Equilibria, and alignment of interests.…
We study 2-player impartial games of the form take-away which produce P-positions (second player winning positions) corresponding to complementary Beatty sequences, given by the continued fractions (1;k,1,k,1,...) and (k+1;k,1,k,1,...). Our…
We consider a coalitional game with the same payoff for all players. To maximize the payoff, the players need to use one collective strategy, if all players are in certain states, and the other strategy otherwise. The current state of each…
Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of…
The paper addresses a problem of sequential bilateral bargaining with incomplete information. We proposed a decision model that helps agents to successfully bargain by performing indirect negotiation and learning the opponent's model.…
Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…
Traditional solvable game theory and mean-field-type game theory (risk-aware games) predominantly focus on quadratic costs due to their analytical tractability. Nevertheless, they often fail to capture critical non-linearities inherent in…
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called \emph{bidding games}, showing the existence…
Parity games are two-player infinite-duration games on graphs that play a crucial role in various fields of theoretical computer science. Finding efficient algorithms to solve these games in practice is widely acknowledged as a core problem…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…
We investigate concurrent two-player win/lose stochastic games on finite graphs with prefix-independent objectives. We characterize subgame optimal strategies and use this characterization to show various memory transfer results: 1) For a…
In this paper we introduce the reactivity in decision-form games. The concept of reactivity allows us to give a natural concept of rationalizable solution for decision-form games: the solubility by elimination of sub-reactive strategies.…