Related papers: Non-cooperative games with preplay negotiations

Dynamic game theory is an increasingly popular tool for modeling multi-agent, e.g. human-robot, interactions. Game-theoretic models presume that each agent wishes to minimize a private cost function that depends on others' actions. These…

This article explores the interaction of two agents during a geopolitical operation. Collaborative work is considered, rather than being done alone. However, each agent has the goal of maximizing personal net profit. We will have 3…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

This paper considers a non-cooperative game in which competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel selfishly optimize their power allocation in order to improve their achievable rates. Previously, it was shown that a…

We propose a novel network formation game that explains the emergence of various hierarchical structures in groups where self-interested or utility-maximizing individuals decide to establish or severe relationships of authority or…

In the game theory literature, there appears to be little research on equilibrium selection for normal-form games with an infinite strategy space and discontinuous utility functions. Moreover, many existing selection methods are not…

We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…

We present a new class of strategic games, mixed capability games, as a foundation for studying how different player capabilities impact the dynamics and outcomes of strategic games. We analyze the impact of different player capabilities…

Non-binding communication is common in daily life and crucial for fostering cooperation, even though it has no direct payoff consequences. However, despite robust empirical evidence, its evolutionary basis remains poorly understood. Here,…

We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is…

Reinforcement learning solutions have great success in the 2-player general sum setting. In this setting, the paradigm of Opponent Shaping (OS), in which agents account for the learning of their co-players, has led to agents which are able…

This short note demonstrates how one can define a transformation of a non-zero sum game into a zero sum, so that the optimal mixed strategy achieving equilibrium always exists. The transformation is equivalent to introduction of a passive…

We provide general theoretical foundations for modeling strategic uncertainty in large distributional Bayesian games with general type spaces, using a version of interim correlated rationalizability. We then focus on the case in which…

We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we…

Probabilistic game structures combine both nondeterminism and stochasticity, where players repeatedly take actions simultaneously to move to the next state of the concurrent game. Probabilistic alternating simulation is an important tool to…

This paper unifies the concepts of evolutionary games and quantum strategies. First, we state the formulation and properties of classical evolutionary strategies, with focus on the destinations of evolution in 2-player 2-strategy games. We…

In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…

In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…

Delegation allows an agent to request that another agent completes a task. In many situations the task may be delegated onwards, and this process can repeat until it is eventually, successfully or unsuccessfully, performed. We consider…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…