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In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. Most parliaments are assembled using apportionment methods that distribute the seats based on the parties' vote counts. Common apportionment methods…

In this paper, we propose a family of approval voting-schemes for electing committees based on the preferences of voters. In our schemes, we calculate the vector of distances of the possible committees from each of the ballots and, for a…

We study the problem of fair sequential decision making given voter preferences. In each round, a decision rule must choose a decision from a set of alternatives where each voter reports which of these alternatives they approve. Instead of…

To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings,…

Peer reviews, evaluations, and selections are a fundamental aspect of modern science. Funding bodies the world over employ experts to review and select the best proposals from those submitted for funding. The problem of peer selection,…

The Voter model is a well-studied stochastic process that models the invasion of a novel trait $A$ (e.g., a new opinion, social meme, genetic mutation, magnetic spin) in a network of individuals (agents, people, genes, particles) carrying…

We compare here the relative strength of four widely used procedures on finite strategic games: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly dominated strategies by a pure/mixed strategy. A complication is that none of these procedures is based…

Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has received little attention here so far. In this setting, the agents…

In many collective decision making situations, agents vote to choose an alternative that best represents the preferences of the group. Agents may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their…

Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational…

We consider the problem of selecting an $n$-member committee made up of one of $m$ candidates from each of $n$ distinct departments. Using an algebraic approach, we analyze positional voting procedures, including the Borda count, as…

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our…

We study an urn process containing red and blue balls and two different strategies to reinforce the urn. Namely, a generalized P\'olya-type strategy versus an i.i.d. one. At each step, one of the two reinforcement strategies is chosen by…

Cooperation in the form of vote trading, also known as logrolling, is central for law-making processes, shaping the development of democratic societies. Empirical evidence of logrolling is scarce and limited to highly specific situations…

A game theoretic distributed decision making approach is presented for the problem of control effort allocation in a robotic team based on a novel variant of fictitious play. The proposed learning process allows the robots to accomplish…

Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…

The standard voting methods in the United States, plurality and ranked choice (or instant runoff) voting, are susceptible to significant voting failures. These flaws include Condorcet and majority failures as well as monotonicity and…

We study online temporal voting, where a group of voters submit 0/1 approvals on sets of alternatives that arrive online over multiple rounds and a single alternative is chosen in each round. We introduce online variants of two well-known…

Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…

Voting can abstractly model any decision-making scenario and as such it has been extensively studied over the decades. Recently, the related literature has focused on quantifying the impact of utilizing only limited information in the…