Related papers: Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games

Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…

We show that equilibria of a sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic game (SSNG) can be adopted by players in corresponding large but finite dynamic games to achieve near-equilibrium payoffs. Such equilibria in the form of random…

In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…

We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p in [0, 1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p…

We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon > 0$.

Graph games are fundamental in strategic reasoning of multi-agent systems and their environments. We study a new family of graph games which combine stochastic environmental uncertainties and auction-based interactions among the agents,…

We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called "(decomposable) coarser transition kernels". This result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria,…

We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the…

Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…

A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…

We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, $\varepsilon$-Nash, subgame perfect, $\varepsilon$-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental…

Players are arranged on a regular lattice and coded with a specific strategy for a pre-defined game. Each player sums their payoffs from playing the game with each of their neighbors, and then adopts the strategy of the most successful…

This paper studies the finite-time horizon Markov games where the agents' dynamics are decoupled but the rewards can possibly be coupled across agents. The policy class is restricted to local policies where agents make decisions using their…

The dynamics in games involving multiple players, who adaptively learn from their past experience, is not yet well understood. We analyzed a class of stochastic games with Markov strategies in which players choose their actions…

In the paper we present a model of discrete-time mean-field game with several populations of players. Mean-field games with multiple populations of the players have only been studied in the literature in the continuous-time setting. The…