Related papers: From winning strategy to Nash equilibrium

We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…

We consider a game in which each player must find a compromise between more daring strategies that carry a high risk for him to be eliminated, and more cautious ones that, however, reduce his final score. For two symmetric players this game…

Coalescence, as a kind of ubiquitous group behavior in the nature and society, means that agents, companies or other substances keep consensus in states and act as a whole. This paper considers coalescence for n rational agents with…

This paper presents a monoidal category whose morphisms are games (in the sense of game theory, not game semantics) and an associated diagrammatic language. The two basic operations of a monoidal category, namely categorical composition and…

Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in…

Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…

Phase transition is a war game. It widely exists in different kinds of complex system beyond physics. Where there is revolution, there is phase transition. The renormalization group transformation, which was proved to be a powerful tool to…

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

In this paper we consider strong Nash equilibria, in mixed strategies, for finite games. Any strong Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient for each coalition. First, we analyze the two--player setting. Our main result, in its simplest…

There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…

The notion of Nash equilibria plays a key role in the analysis of strategic interactions in the framework of $N$ player games. Analysis of Nash equilibria is however a complex issue when the number of players is large. In this article we…

The decision making and management of many engineering networks involves multiple parties with conflicting interests, while each party is constituted with multiple agents. Such problems can be casted as a multi-cluster game. Each cluster is…

In 1953, Kuhn showed that every sequential game has a Nash equilibrium by showing that a procedure, named ``backward induction'' in game theory, yields a Nash equilibrium. It actually yields Nash equilibria that define a proper subclass of…

Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…

The recent theory of sequential games and selection functions by Mar- tin Escardo and Paulo Oliva is extended to games in which players move simultaneously. The Nash existence theorem for mixed-strategy equilibria of finite games is…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…