Related papers: Conducting Truthful Surveys, Cheaply
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…
We consider a model where an agent has a repeated decision to make and wishes to maximize their total payoff. Payoffs are influenced by an action taken by the agent, but also an unknown state of the world that evolves over time. Before…
Auditing fairness of decision-makers is now in high demand. To respond to this social demand, several fairness auditing tools have been developed. The focus of this study is to raise an awareness of the risk of malicious decision-makers who…
This manuscript studies a general approach to construct confidence sets for the solution of stochastic optimization, rendering empirical risk minimization as special cases. Statistical inference for stochastic optimization poses significant…
Common sense suggests that when individuals explain why they believe something, we can arrive at more accurate conclusions than when they simply state what they believe. Yet, there is no known mechanism that provides incentives to elicit…
We study the problem of fitting the high dimensional sparse linear regression model with sub-Gaussian covariates and responses, where the data are provided by strategic or self-interested agents (individuals) who prioritize their privacy of…
We consider the problem of deciding on sampling strategy, in particular sampling design. We propose a risk measure, whose minimizing value guides the choice. The method makes use of a superpopulation model and takes into account uncertainty…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
Unbiased and consistent variance estimators generally do not exist for design-based treatment effect estimators because experimenters never observe more than one potential outcome for any unit. The problem is exacerbated by interference and…
When deciding how to act under uncertainty, agents may choose to act to reduce uncertainty or they may act despite that uncertainty. In communicative settings, an important way of reducing uncertainty is by asking clarification questions…
Proper scoring rules elicit truth-telling when making predictions, or otherwise revealing information. However, when multiple predictions are made of the same event, telling the truth is in general no longer optimal, as agents are motivated…
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in…
In this paper, we propose standard statistical tools as a solution to commonly highlighted problems in the explainability literature. Indeed, leveraging statistical estimators allows for a proper definition of explanations, enabling…
Human agents are increasingly serving as data sources in the context of dynamical systems. Unlike traditional sensors, humans may manipulate or omit data for selfish reasons. Therefore, this paper studies the influence of effort-averse…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…
The acquisition of survey responses is a crucial component in conducting research aimed at comprehending public opinion. However, survey data collection can be arduous, time-consuming, and expensive, with no assurance of an adequate…
We address a practical problem ubiquitous in modern marketing campaigns, in which a central agent tries to learn a policy for allocating strategic financial incentives to customers and observes only bandit feedback. In contrast to…
We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost…